observing 6 that “if . . . counsel in this case found himself overextended, he should have sought help by 7 associating other counsel to assist him in complying with his legal obligations or filed a motion to 8 withdraw as attorney of record.”
How later courts described this case
- observing 6 that “if . . . counsel in this case found himself overextended, he should have sought help by 7 associating other counsel to assist him in complying with his legal obligations or filed a motion to 8 withdraw as attorney of record.”
- explaining that California will “excuse delay” for “a litigant mounting a collateral challenge to a final criminal judgment” “on a showing of good cause”
- explaining that appointment of habeas counsel to represent indigent capital defendants “promote[s] the cause of justice”
- considering abandonment by counsel as good cause for delayed presentation of habeas corpus claims and equating abandonment by counsel with a complete lack of representation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BROWN, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
As Yogi Berra once—or more than once—said, “ ‘You’ve got to be very careful if you don’t know where you are going, because you might not get there.’ ” (Araiza et al., The Jurisprudence of Yogi Berra (1997) 46 Emory L.J. 697 , 746, fn. omitted; cf. People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1105 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 969 P.2d 146 ] (conc. opn. of Brown, J.) [“ ‘ “It’s déjá vu all over again.” ’ ”].)
I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my concurring and dissenting opinion in In re Gallego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 825, 842-853 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d *730 132 , 959 P.2d 290 ] (Gallego). (See also People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1105 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.) [“Thousands upon thousands of more words, and still no closer to a workable standard.”].) As with Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th 825 , and In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 , 959 P.2d 311 ], today’s efforts are “ill-advised and counterproductive . . . , creating a Byzantine system of procedural hurdles, each riddled with exceptions and fact-intensive qualifications, [which] only underminef] their intended purpose [of integrity of judgments, finality, and comity].” (Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 842 (conc, and dis. opn. of Brown, J.).) Even the Attorney General has come to recognize that these attempts to clarify timeliness standards are at cross-purposes with the intent of procedural bars. At oral argument, he urged the court to stand by the principles set forth in In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 ], and reject untimely claims without parsing inquiry into “good cause” and “substantial delay” abstractions, because truly meritorious claims are preserved in any circumstance under the Clark exceptions. (Id. at pp. 797-798.)
I would discharge the order to show cause and deny all claims solely on the merits without preliminary consideration of whether petitioner has demonstrated “good cause” for any “substantial delay” in presenting the petition. I express no opinion on the majority’s determinations regarding the relevance of appellate counsel’s acts or omissions.