refusing to allow information regarding parole or commutation because sentencing instructions self-explanatory and additional information regarding parole or commutation would serve to drown defendants downstream
How later courts described this case
- refusing to allow information regarding parole or commutation because sentencing instructions self-explanatory and additional information regarding parole or commutation would serve to drown defendants downstream
- finding no fundamental error where an EMT testified that “[w]hen he loaded the body between 9:30 and 10 p.m., rigor had begun; and the body exhibited substantially more lividity, and was colder than it had been six hours earlier”
- contrasting Oklahoma with other states and noting that "Oklahoma does not have a specific parole provision for defendants given life sentences for first degree murder"
- refusing to allow information regarding parole or commutation *1103 because sentencing instructions self-explanatory and additional information regarding parole or commutation would serve to drown defendants downstream
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LANE, Judge,
concurring in result.
I disagree with the majority in two respects. First, I cannot adopt the position of the majority that by testifying the appellant automatically changed the standard of review to be used by this Court. In the case relied on by the majority, Lowrey v. State, 87 Okl.Cr. 313 , 197 P.2d 637 (1948), the defendant took the stand and testified as to what was supposed to be the facts. This provided the “direct evidence” relied upon by this Court. In the present matter, the defendant took the stand, but his testimony does not contain any purported evidence as to what occurred when the crime was committed. He simply testified that he was not there. It is my opinion that before Loivrey can be relied upon, testimony or evidence submitted by the defendant must contain direct evidence.
However, I do not think this disagreement changes the outcome of the case. My examination of the facts causes me to find that even when the wholly circumstantial evidence standard is used there is sufficient evidence to justify the jury finding the appellant guilty.
Second, I agree with Judge Chapel that the evidence of the settlement concerning the insurance money should not have been admitted against the appellant. Appellant was not a party to the agreement, and it does not reflect an admission against interest by him. However, I do not think that the prejudice created thereby was sufficient to cause a reversal of the conviction.
I therefore concur in result.