holding, even if borrowed statute has shorter statute 20 of limitations, "[a]ny action on any UCL cause of action is subject to the four-year period 21 of limitations created by that section"
How later courts described this case
- holding, even if borrowed statute has shorter statute 20 of limitations, "[a]ny action on any UCL cause of action is subject to the four-year period 21 of limitations created by that section"
- holding, even if borrowed statute has shorter statute of limitations, “[a]ny action on any 27 UCL cause of action is subject to the four-year period of limitations created by that section”
- concluding that orders for payment of wages unlawfully withheld from an employee pursuant to Labor Code § 227.3 are a restitutionary remedy authorized by section 17203
- holding that unclean hands and other equitable defenses do not preclude liability when the plaintiff seeks to vindicate a UCL claim predicated on Labor Code violations
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WERDEGAR, J., Concurring.—
I agree with the majority that unlawfully withheld wages may be the subject of a remedial order under Business and Professions Code section 17203 because such wages are property of the employee within the contemplation of the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq. (hereafter UCL)). I also agree with the majority’s analysis of the statute of limitations issue. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment insofar as it affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Primarily for the reasons stated in my concurring and dissenting opinion in the companion case, Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 143 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 , 999 P.2d 718 ] (Kraus), however, I am unable to join in much of the majority’s reasoning.
I note that the majority’s references to our prior pronouncements barring damages in UCL actions and to the majority holding in Kraus , barring fluid recovery as a remedy in a UCL action not certified as a class action, are dicta in light of our conclusion that the remedial order in this case is authorized statutorily as a restorative award to parties in interest.
Moreover, while I agree with the majority that equitable considerations may, under Business and Professions Code section 17203, enter into a *182 court’s consideration of the appropriate remedy for a UCL violation, I am concerned that the majority’s explication of that principle may be misleading and provide inadequate guidance to trial courts that will be handling future UCL actions, in that it focuses solely on equitable “defenses” tending to favor defendants. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 179-181.) Most importantly, I would note that equitable considerations normally should not lead a trial court to reduce or eliminate a UCL restorative order when it is established that the defendant committed an unlawful practice, but the defendant claims that its violation was unintentional or committed in a good faith belief the action was lawful. Rather, in general, as between a person who is enriched as the result of his or her violation of the law, and a person intended to be protected by the law who is harmed by its violation, for the violator to retain the benefit would be unjust.