explaining that Oregon's Top Service Body Shop definition of the tort of interference with prospective economic relations and this definition requires proof not only that the alleged interference with the prospective business relationship was intentional, but also that defendant possessed an improper objective or intent
How later courts described this case
- explaining that Oregon's Top Service Body Shop definition of the tort of interference with prospective economic relations and this definition requires proof not only that the alleged interference with the prospective business relationship was intentional, but also that defendant possessed an improper objective or intent
- noting commentator’s statement that “a purely ‘malicious’ motive, in the sense of spite and a desire to do harm ... for its own sake, will make the defendant liable for interference with a contract.” (quotation marks & citation omitted)
- explaining that “[t]he law offers no remedy for” the “inevitabl[e] damage” one competitor causes another “[i]n the rough and tumble of the market place”
- stating that the failure to exercise contractual rights reasonably is a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 Utah LEXIS 67 (2015)
657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982), overruled in part on other grounds by Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21 , 345 P.3d 553
The opinion
HOWE, Justice
(concurring):
I concur in the majority opinion but express a reservation as to the following sentence in Part II:
[Wjhere more than one cause of action has been submitted to a jury and where one of those causes of action was error-free, supported by substantial evidence, and an appropriate basis for the general verdict, the judgment on that verdict will be affirmed, even though the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict on one of the other causes of action submitted.
Under my view of the instruction given the jury, set out in Part III B, it. is unnecessary to take any position on the principle above quoted because that principle is not involved in this case. Even though the instruction instructed jointly on the tort of interference with contract and the tort of interference with prospective economic relations, it did not offer alternatives or choices to the jury as to the separate torts or theories of recovery. The jury could not have been conscious that they were being instructed on two separate torts. They were not told that they could choose between them. I agree with the majority opinion that the instruction properly defined the tort of interference with prospective economic relations and we must presume that the jury followed the instruction in finding liability against the defendant. The fact that the instruction may have also defined another tort which does not lie in this case is of no consequence. There was competent evidence adduced to support the elements of interference with prospective economic relations as illustrated by the cases of Cherberg v. Peoples National Bank of Washington, 88 Wash.2d 595 , 564 P.2d 1137 (1977) and Buxbom v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 535 , 145 P.2d 305 (1944). It should be noted that in both of those cases one contracting party committed that tort on the other contracting party. No third party was involved.
While I recognize that the principle quoted above, which is called the “two issue rule,” is supported by the cases from the *314 jurisdictions cited in the majority opinion, there is a contrary point of view exemplified by the following cases: Bredouw v. Jones, Okl., 431 P.2d 413 (1967); Heinen v. Heinen, 64 Nevada 527, 186 P.2d 770 (1947); Martin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 51 Mont. 31 , 149 P. 89 (1915). Apparently this Court has not heretofore decided this question and I prefer to reserve an expression of opinion on it until it is squarely before us. See Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5 , 336 P.2d 781 (1959) and Watters v. Querry, Utah, 588 P.2d 702 (1978) for examples of a somewhat similar situation arising because of conflicting jury instructions.