Opinion

Farago v. Sacred Heart General Hospital

  • 522 Pa. 410
  • 562 A.2d 300
  • 1989 Pa. LEXIS 325
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Jul 10, 1989
Status
Published
Author
Nix
On the bench
Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos, Stout, Former
Cited by
30 cases

reasoning that “[t]o allow an individual to claim immunity under this provision but in turn to preclude [his] employer the same benefit of the immunity would indeed undermine the stated purpose of the limited immunity conferred under the Act”

How later courts described this case

  • reasoning that “[t]o allow an individual to claim immunity under this provision but in turn to preclude [his] employer the same benefit of the immunity would indeed undermine the stated purpose of the limited immunity conferred under the Act”
  • affirming a finding that the MHPA immunity applied and holding that plaintiff failed to establish gross negligence where plaintiff claimed that she was sexually assaulted by another patient as a result of the hospital’s failure to adequately supervise and protect her
  • stating that the clear intent for enacting Section 7114 of the MHPA was "to provide limited protection from civil and criminal liability to mental health personnel and their employers in rendering treatment in this unscientific and inexact field."
  • in construing statutory reference to any other authorized “person,” the Supreme Court utilized the definitions found in the Statutory Construction Act and concluded that the term encompassed organizational entities, including corporations, partnerships and associations as well as natural persons; the Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ narrow interpretation of the type of conduct for which immunity could be granted

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Allen v. Montgomery Hospital, 447 Pa. Super. 158 (1995)

    Accordingly, both Farago and Werner are distinguishable from the present case.
    Superior Court of PennsylvaniaDec 19, 1995Read it

The opinion

NIX, Chief Justice,

concurring.

I concede that Mr. Justice Larsen offers an interesting argument, based upon the statutory construction, in an effort to support his view that the facility is not immunized under Section 114 of the Mental Health Procedures Act, Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 817, No. 143, § 101 et seq., 50 P.S. § 7101 et seq. Notwithstanding, I do not find it persuasive.

As recognized by the majority, it would be difficult to comprehend the logic of a provision which would attempt to protect from civil liability those persons managing the business entity and yet expose the entity itself to liability under a theory of respondeat superior.

I join the majority opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.