holding covenant not to compete which was ancillary to a valid contract of employment would be enforced to the extent its terms were reasonable
How later courts described this case
- holding covenant not to compete which was ancillary to a valid contract of employment would be enforced to the extent its terms were reasonable
- adopting rule in Wyoming that separate consideration is required to enforce a covenant not to compete created after employment relationship is in existence
- listing examples of separate consider ation sufficient to support a covenant not to compete
- referencing the inequality of bargaining power in employment agreements
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Charlene Hassler v. Circle C Resources, 2022 WY 28 (2022)
861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Hassler v. Circle C Res., 2022 WY 28
The opinion
CARDINE, Justice,
dissenting.
Glenna Hopper has beaten the system. Just prior to being terminated, Dr. Hopper informed Dr. Johnson that “the [covenant] isn’t worth the paper it’s written on.” And *549 she was right. Upon termination, she went into the veterinary business in violation of her covenant not to compete. From July 15, 1991, until October 6, 1992, Dr. Hopper practiced small animal medicine in violation of her solemn promise in her employment agreement not to compete. Whether she continued to practice small animal veterinary medicine after October 6, 1992, in violation of the covenant is not disclosed by the record on appeal.
The court has now decided as a matter of law that a one-year non-competition restriction is reasonable, and a longer period is unreasonable. This pronouncement establishes for the future the period during which competition can be restricted. In this case, appellant may have continued violating the covenant during her appeal— or she may have complied. We do not know. The trial court, on remand, should determine this question, and appellant ought to at least satisfy the one-year non-compete now imposed by this court.
I would hold, therefore, that the covenant was supported by consideration from the beginning and was lawful and enforceable, and I would require that appellant be enjoined from that part of the practice of veterinary medicine specified in the covenant not to compete from the date the trial court, on remand, enters its modified judgment for at least the one-year period which this court now finds reasonable.