stating that a trial court need not explicitly reject each mitigating factor that a defendant argues, if its reasons for the sentence reveal the court's consideration of those factors
How later courts described this case
- stating that a trial court need not explicitly reject each mitigating factor that a defendant argues, if its reasons for the sentence reveal the court's consideration of those factors
- holding "a remand may be required when a reviewing court determines that a sentencing court failed to find mitigating factors that clearly were supported by the record"
- affirming the sentencing court's rejection of mitigation factor two on the ground that drunk driving is intolerable and a defendant's failure to understand this will not inure to his or her benefit in the form of a finding of that factor
- noting that when the trial court follows "the sentencing principles set forth in the Code and defined in our case law, its discretion should be immune from second-guessing."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice LONG,
dissenting.
The issue in this case is not whether the trial judge imposed a sentence in accordance with the Code of Criminal Justice but whether the Appellate Division erred in requesting the judge to explain more fully the reasons for his sentence. In an entirely unremarkable exercise of its reviewing function, the Appellate Division remanded this case to the trial judge to assure that the lengthy NERA sentence imposed on this nineteen-year-old defendant was based on consideration of all relevant matters. It did so because it was unsure, from the record, whether that was the case:
We are also aware, as any reviewing court must be, that even the most experienced judge may, on occasion, not compile the fullest record.
Our obligation on sentencing appeals is to ensure that every defendant is sentenced within the parameters of the criminal code and receives the full consideration to wiiich he is entitled, no matter how' horrendous the offense may be. Were w'e to disregard that obligation w'O would indeed have abdicated our appellate responsibility. ..
In ruling, the panel did not suggest, even obliquely, that the sentence was improper. Rather, in an abundance of caution, it *613 asked the judge to abide by his obligations under Rule 3:21-4(g) and state, more precisely, the reasons for the sentence.
That is exactly the way the case should have been decided. Where there is doubt regarding how the trial judge ruled on issues raised, it is not for the reviewing court to agree or disagree with the sentence or to intuit from silence or ambiguous ruminations the judge’s thoughts. Rather, it is for the judge to state clearly the reasons why he acted as he did.
Because the Appellate Division’s disposition of this case was legally unexceptionable, we should not have granted certification. Indeed, none of the standards for certification set forth in Rule 2:12-4 was satisfied here. The case is not of general importance; there is no unsettled legal question presented; there is no similar case pending in this Court; there is no conflict among appellate panels; the case does not call for our supervision; there are no “interests of justice” elements lurking in the margins of the remand order; and the case does not present “special” reasons warranting our review. Accordingly, I would rule that certification was improvidently granted.
Justices ALBIN and WALLACE join in this opinion.
For reversal and reinstatement—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS—4.
For affirmance—Justices LONG, ALBIN and WALLACE—3.