holding that immunity for police officers requires that officers be (1) acting within the scope of assigned duties; (2) in good faith; (3) reasonably under the circumstances; and (4) that the officers’ acts were discretionary and not merely operational or ministerial duties
How later courts described this case
- holding that immunity for police officers requires that officers be (1) acting within the scope of assigned duties; (2) in good faith; (3) reasonably under the circumstances; and (4) that the officers’ acts were discretionary and not merely operational or ministerial duties
- concluding that extreme and outrageous conduct was shown by “repeated incidents over a period of several weeks in which [plaintiffs supervisor] stared at [plaintiff], followed her, and subjected her to sexually-motivated advances and physically intimidating behavior”
- recognizing “inappropriate sexual conduct in the workplace can, upon sufficient evidence, give rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress”
- repeated incidents in which employee was subjected by co-employee to being stared at, followed, subjected to sexually-motivated advances and physically intimidating behavior
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
THOMAS, Justice,
concurring specially.
I am in accord with the result of tMs case, because it appears to me that in addition to the sexual misconduct emphasized m the majority opimon, Renner essentially was stalking Kanzler. I have a concern, however, that our law in tMs area is not developing in a particularly cohesive manner, noting that two members of the Court dissented in Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164 (Wyo.1996). This is such a potentially volatile tort that I think it is essential that we carefully craft its parameters.
All the trial bench can discern at this point is that if the ground for claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress is sexual misconduct, a decision to grant a summary judgment is full of risk. Yet, it would not be a good thing for the trial bench to abandon its role as a gatekeeper. Our adoption of the Restatement Second rule surely includes this comment:
h. Court and jury. It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1965).
It is my hope that the trial bench and the bar in Wyoming will not read into tMs decision an arbitrary rule that in every case involving sexual misconduct reasonable men can differ as to whether the conduct is so extreme and outrageous as to justify recovery. I do not believe the Court so intends, but if I am mistaken, such a rule would be erroneous in my view.