The opinion
*1163 MOSK, J., Concurring.
I agree with the majority that the transfer of superior court related duties from petitioner, the elected county clerk, to a court executive officer was within the power of the superior court. Government Code section 69898, subdivision (d), so permits; the statute is clear and unambiguous and is therefore not in need of judicial construction as petitioner contends. Nothing in the language of the provision would appear to prohibit a transfer of powers at any time, even during the elected officer’s term. I also agree with the majority that the transfer does not violate the electors’ constitutional right to vote. They did so, and petitioner remains the county clerk. There was no “right” to elect a county clerk who would perform the precise duties of a clerk of the superior court.
At the same time, I question whether such precipitate action was justified as a matter of public policy. Petitioner was overwhelmingly reelected to a second four-year term as Fresno County Clerk. Her performance was thus approved by the voters. Yet less than three weeks before her second term began, her position was stripped of much of its duties. If the superior court determined after the election of the county clerk that a reallocation of duties was desirable, it could have made the transfer prospective only, i.e., commencing at the beginning of the next term of the county clerk. In that way, any potential appearance of the transfer as being punitive would be negated and the positive aspects, in terms of increased efficiency or funding “incentives and rewards” from the Trial Court Budget Commission, would at most be deferred for a few short years.
Having offered the foregoing public policy caveat, however, I cannot deny the authority of the superior court to act as it did, regardless of appearance and consequences. Thus I concur with the majority.