holding that in light of strong evidence that a homicide occurred, it is “entirely understandable that trial counsel ... made no sweeping declarations of his client’s innocence but instead adopted a more realistic approach .... ” arguing that “intoxication negated the mental elements necessary for ... premeditated murder”
How later courts described this case
- holding that in light of strong evidence that a homicide occurred, it is “entirely understandable that trial counsel ... made no sweeping declarations of his client’s innocence but instead adopted a more realistic approach .... ” arguing that “intoxication negated the mental elements necessary for ... premeditated murder”
- stating that “[r]eviewing 23 courts will reverse convictions [on direct appeal] on the ground of inadequate counsel only if the 24 record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for (his or 25 her) act or omission.”
- rejecting defendant’s claim that he needed a new penalty jury to avoid potential prejudice caused by court’s voir dire statements that defense would present evidence in mitigation at penalty trial
- rejecting ineffectiveness claim based on the failure to exhaust peremptory challenges because "the decision whether to accept a jury as constituted is obviously tactical"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Criticized on other grounds by People v. Bolin, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (1998)
12 Cal.4th 415, 436-437 , criticized on other grounds in People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 315
The opinion
MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the judgment in all respects save one: I would vacate the sentence of death.
At the penalty phase, defendant’s jury, like all others, was instructed to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances against each other and thereby determine whether death or life imprisonment without possibility of *502 parole was the appropriate penalty. How could the jurors have possibly discharged their obligation when, as here, the prosecutor presented substantial evidence in aggravation but defense counsel did not present any evidence in mitigation? The answer is obvious: they could not.
Therefore, I would set aside the death sentence as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution. (See In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn. 1 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 892 P.2d 1287 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be set aside as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if defense counsel introduced no available mitigating evidence]; People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 835 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 , 889 P.2d 588 ] (cone, and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.), reiterating People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1073-1075 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 , 846 P.2d 756 ] (cone, and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same], revd. sub nom. Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318 [ 128 L.Ed.2d 293 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 ]; People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 577 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 , 834 P.2d 1171 ] (cone, and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; see also People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1197 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ] (cone, and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [finding a verdict of death unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 when available mitigating evidence was not introduced]; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 531-533 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1059-1062 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] (cone, and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1158-1161 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 635 , 751 P.2d 901 ] (cone, and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [to similar effect under the Eighth Amendment]; People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353, 360-368 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 710 P.2d 925 ] [same].)
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 21, 1996, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.