Opinion

Broadbent v. Broadbent

  • 184 Ariz. 74
  • 203 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 19
  • 907 P.2d 43
  • 1995 Ariz. LEXIS 108
Court
Arizona Supreme Court
Filed
Nov 14, 1995
Status
Published
Author
Feldman
On the bench
Corcoran, Feldman, Moeller, Zlaket, Martone
Cited by
15 cases

holding that parental immunity did not bar cause of action when child drowned after parent left him unattended near swimming pool, observing, "We fail to see why parents should not be held liable for negligence in failing to supervise their own children near the pool, when their liability would be clear had the children not been their own."

How later courts described this case

  • holding that parental immunity did not bar cause of action when child drowned after parent left him unattended near swimming pool, observing, "We fail to see why parents should not be held liable for negligence in failing to supervise their own children near the pool, when their liability would be clear had the children not been their own."
  • remanding for trial where propane gas stove exploded during family camping trip, injuring child
  • holding status as parent does not bar suit, but adopting reasonable parent test for suits of minors against parents
  • acknowledging the need "to protect the right of parents to raise their children by their own methods and in accordance with their own attitudes and beliefs"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FELDMAN, Chief Justice,

specially concurring.

I join in the abrogation of parental immunity and the court’s adoption of the reasonable and prudent parent test but write separately to sound a note of caution. Although we abolish a rule of tort immunity, we must bear in mind that “difficult problems” remain in “determining when a physical harm should be regarded as actionable.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G cmt. k. If the alleged tortious conduct does not grow out of the family relationship, the question of negligence “may be determined as if the parties were not related.” Id. However, there are areas of broad discretion in which only parents have authority to make decisions. In these areas, I agree with the Restatement’s view that “the standard of a reasonable prudent parent ... reeognize[s] the existence of that discretion and thus ... require[s] that the [parent’s] conduct be palpably unreasonable in order to impose liability.” Id. If, however, the charged breach of duty falls outside the area of a parent’s discretionary authority and is, instead, within the obligation of due care owed by anyone who has supervisory or other responsibility for another’s safety, then the test should be much more flexible.

Thus, the parent who decides to enroll a two-year-old child in swimming lessons at a neighborhood pool operates within the realm of parent-child decision-making. Although the child might be hurt during the course of such lessons, the decision to put the child in that position is peculiarly a matter of parental authority rather than a question of supervisory care or performance. Under the proper application of the reasonable and prudent parent test, as a matter of law there should be no liability unless one could say the decision was palpably unreasonable under given circumstances.

The facts of this case illustrate the other side of the coin. The act of leaving an unsupervised two-year-old child, who was unable to swim, at the side of a swimming pool was not an exercise of parental decision-making but an inadvertent act in the performance of duties owed by a caretaker. As the Restatement indicates, the reasonable and prudent parent test extends a great deal of flexibility to the first example but much less, if any, to the second.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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