The opinion
RAPP, Judge.
Plaintiff, Violet 0. Brown, appeals the trial court’s judgment for defendant, B & D Land Company, following a non-jury trial.
Plaintiff purchased a twelve-acre tract on which to build a house and barn from defendant on November 9, 1984. Plaintiff executed various documents, receiving in return a warranty deed. None of the documents, including the “Property Disclosure,” stated the property was in a flood plain or prone to flooding. 1 It was undisputed plaintiff was assured by defendant’s agent, the selling realtor, the property could not be sold for development unless it had been “checked out and approved,” thereby assuaging her concerns of possible flooding. 2 Thereafter, she discovered the property was flooded and on August 10, 1985, demanded return of her monies and contract rescission. Defendant responded by letter — refusing to rescind — stating, while it had returned another’s money due to flooding, for plaintiff it was going to reconstruct the access road. Following reconstruction, plaintiff again demanded return of her monies in August 1987. A petition for rescission was filed January 25, 1988. 3 The trial court in a bench trial found that “prior to the reconstruction there was a latent misrepresentation which would lead to the ability to rescind. Subsequent to the reconstruction of the road, the defendant has cured that defect according to the evidence before the Court and, therefore, judgment for the defendant.” Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff alleges a single proposition, urging trial court error in its holding, in effect, that defendant had cured its misrepresentation by rebuilding the road.
*382 This case is similar to that of Sokolosky v. Tulsa Orthopaedic Associates, 566 P.2d 429 (Okla.1977), and Onstott v. Osborne, 417 P.2d 291 (Okla.1966). In Sokolosky and Onstott , the court held that, in actions involving real estate purchases, fraud may not be predicated on false statements when the party could ascertain the truth with reasonable diligence. This principle is well established and is evidenced by the Onstott court quoting with approval from Nowka v. West, 77 Okla. 24 , 186 P. 220 (1919):
Where the means of knowledge are at hand and equally available to both parties, and the subject of purchase is alike open to their inspection, if the purchaser does not avail himself of these means and opportunities, he will not be heard to say that he had been deceived by the vendor’s misrepresentations. If, having eyes, he will not see matters directly before them, where no concealment is made or attempted, he will not be entitled to favorable consideration when he complains that he has suffered from his own voluntary blindness and been misled by overconfidence in the statements of another. (Emphasis added.)
Onstott, 417 P.2d at 293 .
Here plaintiffs assertions of misrepresentation dealt with defendant’s failure to disclose the property’s flood plain location. However, the means and knowledge of obtaining the truth regarding the property were readily available to plaintiff upon inquiry. Thus, it must be concluded that the trial court here reached the correct result for the wrong reason. However, under Seal v. Carroll, 439 P.2d 185 (Okla. 1968), a judgment, if correct, must stand regardless of the theory or conclusions upon which it is based.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
MEANS, P.J., concurs.
BRIGHTMIRE, J., dissents.
.The general partner of defendant had commissioned a study and knew a portion of the realty was in the flood plain but did not disclose this fact to plaintiff.
. She testified she would not have purchased the property if she had known it was subject to flooding.
. This action was brought within the statutory time limits set forth in 12 O.S.1981 § 95(1).