Opinion

Fitzsimmons v. State Bar

  • 34 Cal. 3d 327
  • 193 Cal. Rptr. 896
  • 667 P.2d 700
  • 1983 Cal. LEXIS 219
Court
California Supreme Court
Filed
Aug 18, 1983
Status
Published
Author
Bird
On the bench
Bird
Cited by
15 cases

although afforded great measure of due process, disciplinary proceedings do not extend to attorneys the extent of due process afforded a criminal defendant because such proceedings are sui generis as opposed to purely criminal or purely civil

How later courts described this case

  • although afforded great measure of due process, disciplinary proceedings do not extend to attorneys the extent of due process afforded a criminal defendant because such proceedings are sui generis as opposed to purely criminal or purely civil
  • attorneys subject to disciplinary proceedings are not afforded all procedural safeguards which are extended to criminal defendants because such proceedings are sui generis as opposed to purely civil or criminal in character
  • Attorneys subject to disciplinary proceedings are not afforded all of the procedural safeguards which are extended to criminal defendants as they are sui generis as opposed to purely civil or criminal in character.

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

BIRD, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.

I concur in the judgment of the court. However, I do not agree that petitioner’s failure to obtain a written receipt from S amounted to a violation of his oath and duties as an attorney or involved moral turpitude. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 331-332.)

Evidence presented at the State Bar hearings showed that petitioner specifically asked his client C about whether to obtain a receipt from S. C replied, “No receipt. She’d be insulted [referring to S]. We’ve been dealing together since 1936, and we’ve been in a lot of tight conditions [szc] together. We’re old friends.”

Thus, petitioner acted according to his client’s express wishes in not asking S for a receipt. Under these circumstances, I fail to see how petitioner’s actions amounted to misconduct and/or moral turpitude. I do not believe that any statutory provision, rule of court, or prior decision of this court requires an attorney, over his client’s objection, to insult an “old friend” of the client.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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