concluding that contracts for indemnity are strictly construed
How later courts described this case
- concluding that contracts for indemnity are strictly construed
- “[a] third party claim for indemnity is ... for reimbursement based upon contract or some other independent duty existing between indemnitor and indem-nitee.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING OPINION OF
ABE, J., WITH WHOM LANHAM, J., JOINS
While I concur with this court’s decision, I do not believe that if should rule on the issue of indemnity.
*165 This court has stated that “[ajppellate courts will not consider any question not necessary or relevant to the final determination of the appeal.” Glover v. Fong, 42 Haw. 560, 577 (1958); see also In re Brandt, 25 Haw. 51, 52 (1919). Here, I believe the opinion of this court transgresses this general rule.
On appeal in this court, Hawaiian Electric’s sole claim for indemnity against Tanji was based upon an alleged agreement entered into by Hawaiian Electric and Tanji. On this issue this court holds: “Assuming that the Joint Pole permit is a contract, we are of the opinion that the language of the permit did not constitute an indemnity contract as a matter of law.”
Now, having reached this conclusion, it becomes unnecessary for this court to decide whether a claim for indemnification lies outside the scope of the exclusive liability provisions of HRS § 386-5.
In my opinion, this issue raises the following question: “Did the compensation acts, in conferring immunity on the employer from common-law suits, mean to do so only at the expense of the injured employee, or also at the expense of outsiders?” 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 76.52.
The determination of this issue involves consideration of legislative policy involved in a complex statutory scheme. As I had stated above, in this appeal it is not necessary to decide this policy question; and, therefore, I believe that this issue should be left for future determination in a proper case.