“legislative history of [Oregon’s recreational use statute indicates legislative intent] to limit its application to landholdings which tended to have recreational value but not be susceptible to adequate policing or correction of dangerous conditions.”
How later courts described this case
- “legislative history of [Oregon’s recreational use statute indicates legislative intent] to limit its application to landholdings which tended to have recreational value but not be susceptible to adequate policing or correction of dangerous conditions.”
- "agricultural lands" not interpreted as land that could simply be farmed since the fact that land could be farmed does not distinguish it from most of the land in the state
- application of the act should be limited to land which tended to have recreational value but was not susceptible to adequate policing or correction of dangerous conditions
- interpreting Oregon's recreational use statute
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HOWELL, J.,
specially concurring.
While I have serious doubts that the average juror needs an expert witness to tell him the difference between a backyard pasture and an improved baseball field, I do not believe that such evidence was of any particular significance in this case. However, I do not believe that the test of admissibility of such evidence is whether or not expert evidence could be of help to a jury. If the expert opinion evidence is related to some technical field, it is admissible. If the jury is equally well qualified to find the truth or the subject is a matter of common knowledge, expert opinion evidence is not admissible. In the gray area in between we have held that the admissibility of such evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge. See Yundt v. D & D Bowl, Inc., 259 Or 247 , 486 P2d 553 (1971) ; Cooney v. McGee, 268 Or 521 , 521 P2d 1051 (1974).