evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to determine whether the defendant harbored either express or implied malice for purposes of a second-degree murder conviction. If voluntary intoxication prevented a defendant from forming malice, the defendant cannot be found guilty of murder
How later courts described this case
- evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to determine whether the defendant harbored either express or implied malice for purposes of a second-degree murder conviction. If voluntary intoxication prevented a defendant from forming malice, the defendant cannot be found guilty of murder
- cone, and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.
- conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in People v. Mendoza
7 Cal.4th 437, 441, 446-448 , superseded by statute as stated in People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 977
The opinion
BAXTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
On the following points, I agree with Justice Mosk. Implied malice may be a specific mental state, but it is not a specific intent. Thus, murder based on implied malice is not a specific intent crime. Penal Code section 22, subdivision (b), as amended in 1982, is an exception to the rule that “[n]o act. . . is less criminal by reason of’ the perpetrator’s voluntary intoxication (id., subd. (a)); by its express terms, the exception applies only “when a specific intent crime is charged.” Hence, the statute withholds voluntary intoxication as a defense to implied-malice murder. This statutory decision accords with long-established principles of Anglo-American and California law. Its purpose is clear and sound. In its absence, an irresponsible decision to get drunk could become the means of escaping Ml liability for the wanton, heedless violence which intoxication is so inclined to produce. The Legislature was entitled to prevent that anomaly. Its choice does not offend due process. Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to an instruction which implied that he could not be guilty of drunk-driving murder if the jury found him to have been unconscious, as a result of voluntary intoxication, at the time of the collision.
In my view, this is all we need to decide. Given the particular difficulty of this area of law, wisdom counsels against saying more than is absolutely necessary. Therefore, I express no view on any other matter discussed in the other opinions in this case.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied January 13, 1994. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.