The opinion
JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, concurring:
When our judgment in this case was originally announced, Justice Simon and I believed, predicated upon what we considered to be relevant language in sections 6 and 8 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, pars. 866, 868), that the General Assembly had intended the term “aggregate levy” as used in the Truth in Taxation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 861 et seq.) to include taxes levied for debt-service purposes. Consequently, we were noted as dissenting. Since that time, the same General Assembly amended the Act (Pub. Act 82 — 760, 1982 Ill. Laws 202 ) in a manner indicating approval of the methods of computing the 105% tax limitation provisions of the Act which were used by the county clerk in this case and which did not include amounts levied for debt-service purposes.
Since that amendment seems to indicate that the legislature intended the result which the majority reaches despite what appeared to Justice Simon and me to be language in sections 6 and 8 requiring a contrary result, we now concur in the judgment of the court.
JUSTICE SIMON joins in this concurrence.