jury instructed that "[a] design defect is one in which the product, however perfectly manufactured, incorporates or fails to incorporate a design feature with the result that injury is proximately caused thereby”; the supreme court reversed a verdict for the plaintiff and adopted the test set forth in Barker v Lull Engineering Co, Inc, 20 Cal 3d 413; 143 Cal Rptr 225; 573 P2d 443 [1978], which requires a judge to instruct the jury that a product is defective in design if it "fail[s] to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect” or if "the defendant fails to prove . . . that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweighed the risk of danger inherent in such design.” Beck, supra, p 884 [emphasis added]
How later courts described this case
- jury instructed that "[a] design defect is one in which the product, however perfectly manufactured, incorporates or fails to incorporate a design feature with the result that injury is proximately caused thereby”; the supreme court reversed a verdict for the plaintiff and adopted the test set forth in Barker v Lull Engineering Co, Inc, 20 Cal 3d 413; 143 Cal Rptr 225; 573 P2d 443 [1978], which requires a judge to instruct the jury that a product is defective in design if it "fail[s] to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect” or if "the defendant fails to prove . . . that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweighed the risk of danger inherent in such design.” Beck, supra, p 884 [emphasis added]
- “the state of the art, or conformity with industry-wide practices will not protect a manufacturer from liability”
- “[T]he plaintiff need only show, for strict liability to apply, that he used the product in an intended or reasonably foreseeable fashion and the product failed to perform in that capacity as safely as expected.”
- general policy of strict liability demands that responsibility for placing defective products on the market should not be shifted to those in no position to assess the danger
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BURKE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
To the extent that it is not inconsistent with the view expressed in my dissenting opinion in Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 47 (Alaska 1976), I agree with and join in the separate opinion of my esteemed colleague, Senior Justice Dimond. Thus, I dissent from the majority’s approval of the trial court’s instructions on the issue of comparative negligence.
In all other respects I concur.