holding that, contrary to Miller and Smith , under the Pennsylvania Constitution, a person retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records even though a bank employee would have free access to view the contents contained therein
How later courts described this case
- holding that, contrary to Miller and Smith , under the Pennsylvania Constitution, a person retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records even though a bank employee would have free access to view the contents contained therein
- holding that under the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, Section 8, defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his bank record, despite not having such an interest under the Fourth Amendment
- recognizing under Article I, Section 8 an expectation of privacy in bank records
- holding that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his bank record under Article I, Section 8, despite not having such an interest under the Fourth Amendment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
The petition of appellant, Jill DeJohn, for reargument should be granted to reconsider whether illegally obtained evidence was used in her trial for attempted extortion.
In the majority opinion, this Court held that although appellant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her bank records and thus had standing to challenge their admissibility, appellant had waived her rights to challenge this same evidence and the fruits thereof as to her attempted evidence conviction. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32 , 403 A.2d 1283 (1979). However, this issue was not waived.
While the bank check used to purchase the typewriter was not introduced at appellant’s trial for attempted extortion, appellant did file a motion to suppress this evidence and the other evidence obtained from the information on the check— *80 the fruits of the illegal subpoena. This motion was denied. Although at trial appellant did not object to the reference to the check used to purchase the typewriter, appellant continues to preserve the issue by objecting to the introduction of the typewriter and the bill of sale for the typewriter — the fruits obtained illegally. In this Court, appellant, as she had done at every stage of the proceeding, argued that the typewriter and bill of sale for the typwriter were “fruits of the poisonous tree” — the check — and were not admissible. Under these circumstances the issue of the use of the inadmissible evidence to obtain the conviction should be reconsidered. Appellant’s petition for reargument as to this issue should be granted.