“[N]umerous formal irregularities, each of which in itself might be deemed harmless, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial, in which event a reversal would be required.”
How later courts described this case
- “[N]umerous formal irregularities, each of which in itself might be deemed harmless, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial, in which event a reversal would be required.”
- explaining the cumulative error doctrine
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Moore
dissenting.
The instant case involves a homicide committed in perpetration of the crime of robbery. Under the pertinent statute the crime of necessity could be nothing less than murder in the first degree. The only area within which the jury had any discretion was with reference to the punishment to be inflicted in the event of a verdict of guilty. The jury in fixing the punishment in this case returned a verdict imposing a sentence of life imprisonment. Had the jury fixed the punishment at death I would agree that the errors committed in the trial of the *79 case would require a reversal of the judgment. This is true because the evidence erroneously admitted might have operated to the prejudice of the accused with relation to the fixing of the penalty.
Under the record here it is inconceivable that any jury of qualified persons could consider the evidence which was properly received without reaching the conclusion that the guilt of the accused had been established beyond all question. The defendant admitted participation in the contemplated robbery which resulted in murder. Over his own signature he approved the written statement of the boy Beaty concerning the preparation for and perpetration of the offense.
I respectfully submit that the overwhelming weight of competent evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, coupled with the fact that the crime charged was a felony murder, with the further circumstance that the jury imposed the minimum sentence, should lead to the conclusion that no prejudice resulted to the defendant because of the admission of incompetent evidence. Numerous opinions of this court have indicated that where, as here, the guilt of an accused is overwhelmingly established by competent evidence, the admission of some incompetent testimony will not be grounds for reversal in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the rights of the accused. In this connection I quote from May v. People, 77 Colo. 432 , 236 Pac. 1022 , the following: “The competent evidence in the instant case so clearly establishes the guilt of the defendant as to leave no room for doubt.”
It is my opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Pringle authorizes me to state that he concurs in these views.