opining that "[t]he legal relationship between [one party] and [another party] is to be determined from the contract between and from their intentions in establishing and carrying out that relationship as manifested in its performance and the surrounding circumstances" and then explaining the indicators that an independent contractor relationship exists
How later courts described this case
- opining that "[t]he legal relationship between [one party] and [another party] is to be determined from the contract between and from their intentions in establishing and carrying out that relationship as manifested in its performance and the surrounding circumstances" and then explaining the indicators that an independent contractor relationship exists
- noting that when determining “whether a relationship is that of independent contractor or that of mere servant,” the “control over the work reserved by the employer” is critical and is judged “not [by] the supervision and control which is actually exercised,” but rather by “whether, from the nature of the relationship, the right to do so exists”
- explaining that the principal test to determine whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor is “the control over the work reserved by the employer.”
- motorcyclist acted reasonably when confronted by a sudden emergency not brought about by his own negligence
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Maylen v. Great West Casualty Co., 15 La.App. 3 Cir. 484 (2015)
Moreover, the facts in Hickman, 262 La. 102, 262 So.2d 385, are readily distinguishable from the facts in the instant case.
Distinguished by Jones v. Becnel, 392 F. Supp. 951 (1974)
The only case cited by plaintiff in opposition to the motions of defendants to dismiss or for summary judgment is Hickman v. Southern Pacific Transport Co., 262 La. 102, 262 So.2d 385 (1972), which is clearly distinguishable from the present case.
The opinion
TATE, Justice
(concurring).
The writer fully concurs in the holdings of the majority.
With regard to damages, the majority’s award is limited to the normal residual from the fracture received at the time of the accident. The majority disallows any additional award from the “re”-injury while sleepwalking. I concur with the majority, upon the express understanding that this disallowance of additional recovery is based upon its findings that the “re”-injury and its permanent residual would have occurred, whether or not the boy’s leg was weakened by the tort-caused initial fracture — that is, upon the understanding that the original tort-caused fracture did not contribute at all to (a) the sleepwalking fall, (b) the “re”-injury occasioned thereby, and (c) the permanent residual resulting therefrom.
*123 If, on the other hand, the subsequent accident or subsequent residual would not have occurred without the tort-impaired condition, then the tortfeasors are liable for all such consequences to which the original tort contributed. See: Restatement of Torts, Second, Section 460 (1965); Restatement of Torts, First, Section 917 (1939); Prosser on Torts, Section 44, esp. at pp. 279, 280-281, Section 52, esp. at pp. 315-16 and pp. 320-21 (4th ed., 1971); Eble v. City of New Orleans, 181 So.2d 805 (La.App. 4th Cir., 1966).
I respectfully concur.