Opinion

Chaussee v. Maryland Casualty Co.

  • 60 Wash. App. 504
  • 803 P.2d 1339
Court
Court of Appeals of Washington
Filed
Jun 27, 1991
Status
Published
Author
Winsor
On the bench
Winsor
Cited by
71 cases

considering “the releasing person’s damages; the merits of the releasing person’s liability theory; the merits of the released person’s defense theory; the released person’s relative faults; the risks and expenses of continued litigation; the released person’s ability to pay; any evidence of bad faith, collusion, or fraud; the extent of the releasing person’s investigation and preparation of the case; and the interests of the parties not being released”

How later courts described this case

  • considering “the releasing person’s damages; the merits of the releasing person’s liability theory; the merits of the released person’s defense theory; the released person’s relative faults; the risks and expenses of continued litigation; the released person’s ability to pay; any evidence of bad faith, collusion, or fraud; the extent of the releasing person’s investigation and preparation of the case; and the interests of the parties not being released”
  • applying the factors in Glover v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 98 Wash.2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Crown Controls, Inc. v. Smiley, 110 Wash.2d 695, 756 P.2d 717 (1988)
  • applying the factors in Glover v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 98 Wn.2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Crown Controls, Inc. v. Smiley, 110 Wn.2d 695, 756 P.2d 717 (1988)
  • When an insured agrees to a covenant settlement they “may settle for an inflated amount to escape exposure and thus call into question the reasonableness of the settlement.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Winsor, J. *

(dissenting) — I dissent. My disagreement is with the majority's rejection of the alternative argument by Nodells that they provided sufficient evidence of the reasonableness of the settlement. Majority, at 513-14.

I focus primarily upon exhibit 44, the written evaluation prepared for Maryland by two experienced and able *516 defense lawyers, Mr. Wohlford and Mr. McClure. That evaluation by itself constitutes ample evidence that the $7,500,000 settlement was within the range of a probable damage award; it states that the chances were 80 to 90 percent for a plaintiff's verdict, and that the chances of the jury's finding any contributory negligence were very unlikely. It also states that:

[W]e see a $2,000,000 to $2,500,000 verdict as being the minimum. Based upon recent cases involving quadriplegics, it cannot be ruled out that the verdict in this case would go to $7,500,000 or more. Plaintiff is going to be able to project special damages as high as that.

Wohlford explained that he and McClure underlined "minimum" because "we thought that that was a probably overly optimistic view. We were saying that that would be considered the low end of what you could expect and we wanted them to understand that."

Other testimony also establishes the reasonableness of the settlement. Both McClure and Wohlford testified that Scott Nodell was as seriously injured as anyone they had ever seen. Lawyer Frank Draper regarded McClure's "potential damages exposure" as having been "substantially understated." Maryland claims representative Hansen stated in a memorandum that exposure in the case could be $10 million to $30 million. That estimate may well have been realistic, considering that McClure's own estimate of $7,500,000 was for special damages only, and ignored the claims of Scott's parents. In short, there was ample evidence to permit the jury to conclude that $7,500,000 was a reasonable settlement for Mr. Chaussee.

I would reverse the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but rule that defendant Reed McClure is entitled to dismissal as there was insufficient evidence to establish the standard of practice for a law firm in this situation.

After modification, further reconsideration denied June 27, 1991.

Judge Robert W. Winsor was a member of the Court of Appeals at the time oral argument was heard on this matter. He is now serving as a judge pro tempore of the court pursuant to CAR 21(c).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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