recognizing the balancing right of officers to attend public proceedings, it found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to suggest that police officers attend the hearing in civilian clothes when possible and to rule that if more than two or three uniformed officers were present at the same time, the court would entertain a renewed motion to exclude them
How later courts described this case
- recognizing the balancing right of officers to attend public proceedings, it found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to suggest that police officers attend the hearing in civilian clothes when possible and to rule that if more than two or three uniformed officers were present at the same time, the court would entertain a renewed motion to exclude them
- stating that a defendant’s right to due process may be violated when use of separate juries allows otherwise inadmissible evidence to be introduced against a defendant, if such evidence results in “identifiable prejudice or gross unfairness” to the defendant
- acknowledging improper implication could be drawn from expression, suggesting that taint from impropriety removed by curative instruction but ultimately concluding that claim was not properly preserved for review
- approving use of mannequins as illustrative evidence “to assist the jury in understanding the testimony of witnesses or to clarify the circumstances of a crime”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by People v. Merritt, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 265 (2017)
4 Cal.4th 1233, 1305 , overruled on another ground in People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 821-822
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I dissent.
In concluding that the judgment against each of the defendants must be reversed in its entirety, I do not ignore the strong evidence adduced at trial bearing on both guilt and penalty. But the record requires reversal in spite of such evidence.
As to defendant Cummings, there was Wheeler error in the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge to Black prospective juror Leon Passmore on grounds *1344 of presumed group bias. (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ].) I recognize that the prosecutor attempted to proffer “neutral” reasons for his strike. The attempt failed. In part, the reasons did not match the facts; in other part, they were little more than pretexts.
As to defendant Gay, the error was not in what the prosecutor did but in what trial counsel did not do. The failings of Gay’s counsel were “pervasive and serious,” and “resulted in a breakdown of the adversarial process at trial; that breakdown establishes a violation of defendant’s federal and state constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel; and that violation mandates reversal of the judgment even in the absence of a showing of specific prejudice.” (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 84 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495 , 825 P.2d 388 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgments.
Appellants’ petitions for a rehearing were denied June 23, 1993, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Arabian, J., and George, J., did not participate therein. Mosk, J„ was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.