explaining that written policy in employee handbook that “[n]o employee will be terminated without proper cause or reason and not until management has made a careful review of the facts” was insufficient to overcome express disclaimer that “[t]he contents of this booklet are not intended to establish . . . any contract between . . . [the employer] and any employee, or group of employees”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that written policy in employee handbook that “[n]o employee will be terminated without proper cause or reason and not until management has made a careful review of the facts” was insufficient to overcome express disclaimer that “[t]he contents of this booklet are not intended to establish . . . any contract between . . . [the employer] and any employee, or group of employees”
- holding “that provisions in a handbook will not create enforceable rights when the handbook expressly states that such provisions are not intended to create an employment contract” (citing Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus. Computers, 452 Mich. 405, 550 N.W.2d 243 (1996))
- explaining that at the pretext stage, “mere disproof of an employer’s proffered [legitimate] reason [for the adverse action] is insufficient to survive summary [judgment], unless such disproof also raises a triable question of [unlawful] motive, not mere falsity”
- explaining that Michigan’s four-part test is an “adaptation of the United States Supreme Court’s McDonnell Douglas test”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mallett, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in parí). I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiff cannot assert a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment because the handbook specifically disclaims any intent to create contractual or *186 binding obligations to employees. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that even when an employer demonstrates a bona fide reduction in force, a plaintiff may survive a motion for summary disposition by presenting sufficient evidence that the RIF was a mere pretext and that discriminatory animus was a true motivation behind the discharge. I further agree that the plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to survive summary disposition of her age discrimination claim. Consequently, I am in agreement with parts i, n, m(A), and m(B) of the majority opinion.
However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that summary disposition of the plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim was proper. For the reasons expressed in part n(c) of Justice Cavanagh’s dissent, I believe that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable person could find that the plaintiff’s demotion was motivated by gender discrimination.