holding death of patient did not preclude appellate review where issue was of important public interest, capable of repetition, yet apt to elude appellate review
How later courts described this case
- holding death of patient did not preclude appellate review where issue was of important public interest, capable of repetition, yet apt to elude appellate review
- explaining that courts should “adhere to the sound tenet of jurisprudence that courts should avoid constitutional issues when the issue at hand may be decided upon other grounds.”
- finding a trial court’s determination of whether to remove life sustaining treatment from an adult who did not leave an advance directive is an important public interest, capable of repetition yet apt to elude appellate review
- stating that this Court adheres “to the sound tenet of jurisprudence that courts should avoid constitutional issues when the issue at hand may be decided upon other grounds”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by In Re DLH, 2 A.3d 505 (2010)
Moreover, the court agreed with DPW that Fiori was inapplicable, given that David's life-threatening medical condition was temporary.
Distinguished by In re D.L.H., 606 Pa. 550 (2010)
Moreover, the court agreed with DPW that Fiori was inapplicable, given that David’s life-threatening medical condition was temporary.
Distinguished by In re D.L.H., 2009 Pa. Super. 25 (2009)
The trial court perceived the issues raised in the petition as presenting pure questions of law, and concluded that since D.L.H. was not in a permanent vegetative state (“PVS”), the right of close family members to decline medical treatment of another, as enunciated in In re Fiori, 543 Pa. 592, 673 A.2d 905 (1996), was inapplicable.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the majority opinion except insofar as it imposes a requirement that the consent of two physicians be obtained *609 before a close relative may elect to remove life sustaining treatment from an adult. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a relative of an adult who is in a persistent vegetative state would not consider the attending physician’s medical diagnosis or, if needed, consult with another physician before making such a weighty decision. Where the family member exercises his or her judgment and concludes that the advice or expertise of another physician is unnecessary, it is unduly burdensome to require two qualified physicians, in addition to the attending physician, to evaluate the patient’s condition.
The majority requires written statements of two physicians and of the attending physician certifying that the patient is in a persistent vegetative state. There is no statement of policy reasons or explanation given for the necessity of obtaining statements from three physicians. If the purpose is to ascertain whether the patient is in fact in a persistent vegetative state, that may be accomplished by the written statement of a single qualified physician. The written statements of additional physicians do nothing more than assuage a doubting conscience. They do not assure the infallibility of the diagnosis. If the family member needs such reassurance, he or she will seek it. I see no reason for the law to require it.
I would hold that the written statement of a single physician is sufficient to establish the patient’s condition where there is no dispute among the interested parties. We have defined “interested parties” to include close family members, a guardian of an incompetent, attending physicians, and the care facility in which the patient is located. I trust that those parties will voice their concerns or disagreement if dissatisfied with the diagnosis. In the absence of any compelling reason to require written statements of two additional physicians, I must depart from that portion of the majority’s decision.