painting business was not sufficiently related to normal operations of city water tower to warrant a finding that city and painting company were “common employers” of employee injured while painting water tower
How later courts described this case
- painting business was not sufficiently related to normal operations of city water tower to warrant a finding that city and painting company were “common employers” of employee injured while painting water tower
- on appeal of directed verdict, “the test has been stated as whether ‘anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.’ That the inferences be reasonable requires that they be based on ‘probabilities rather than possibilities’ and not the result of ‘mere speculation and conjecture’ ” [citations omitted]
- “a person who voluntarily enters into a contract of employment to repair an old and visibly decrepit monument may be in a position to demand substantial remuneration for the risk he or she is taking, but cannot demand that the monument be fortified and made safe for climbing”
- inference permissible that a rusty bolt had snapped
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Quirico, J.
(with whom Hennessey, C.J., and Wilkins, J., join, concurring in the result). This action was tried by the parties and submitted to the jury on the plaintiff’s claim that he was injured by reason of a hidden or concealed defect on the defendant’s premises, of which defect the defendant was aware or should have been aware through the exercise of reasonable care. The jury returned a substantial verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. The Appeals Court agreed, reversed the judgment and vacated the verdict. On the plaintiff’s appeal therefrom this court is ordering that the verdict and judgment for the plaintiff be reinstated, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. I concur with the result.
This case was briefed and argued by both parties before the Appeals Court and this court on the assumption that it was governed by the “hidden defect” rule, so called. It is my opinion that this court’s holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff on that theory is dispositive of this appeal. However, the court has chosen to go beyond that and has declared, for the reasons discussed *229 in part 4 of the opinion, that the “hidden defect” rule “no longer is to be applied in cases involving tort actions against landowners.”
I recognize that in an appropriate case expressly raising the issue, and in which we have the benefit of full briefing and argument on the subject, it may be advisable that we review our position on the “hidden defect” rule, and that much of the discussion contained in part 4 of the court’s present opinion would be of significance in such a case. However, for all of the reasons stated above it is my opinion that this is not the appropriate case in which to abrogate the rule.