Opinion

General Dynamics Corp. v. County of Los Angeles

  • 51 Cal. 2d 59
  • 330 P.2d 794
  • 1958 Cal. LEXIS 207
Court
California Supreme Court
Filed
Oct 24, 1958
Status
Published
Author
McCOMB
On the bench
Traynor, McComb
Cited by
35 cases
Authority
More cited than 4.9%

The opinion

McCOMB, J.

I concur in the affirmance of the judgments for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Traynor in the majority opinion and also for the reason that the property here involved upon which defendants had attempted to levy and collect taxes was not the property of plaintiffs.

Article XIII of the state Constitution authorizes the taxation of “property.” The term “property” in the broadest meaning is ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude every one else from interfering with it. (Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951), p. 1382.)

In Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Byram, 57 Cal.App.2d 311, 317 [ 134 P.2d 15 ], Mr. Justice Bishop says, “A common characteristic of a property right, is that it may be disposed of, transferred to another.”

In Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irr. Dist., 207 Cal. 521, 524 [ 279 P. 128 ], the definition of property is given as “the *72 exclusive right of possession, enjoying, and disposing of a thing; it is ‘the right and interest which a man has in lands and chattels, to the exclusion of others’; and the term is sufficiently comprehensive to include every species of estate, real or personal.”

In view of the foregoing definitions, the property involved in the instant cases was not property of plaintiffs since it did not have the attributes as defined above.

Plaintiffs could not use any part of the property without the consent of the government. Neither did plaintiffs have the ownership, that is, the unrestricted right to possess it, to use it, or to exclude everyone else from interfering with it. Plaintiffs did not have the power to dispose of it, to transfer it, to pledge or to hypothecate it. The property, so far as plaintiffs were concerned, had no exchangeable value and did not go to make up part of plaintiffs’ estate. Therefore, since the property in question was not the property of plaintiffs, it was not properly taxable by defendants.

Schauer, J., concurred.

Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied November 19, 1958.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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