stating that “where the intent of the legislature is clear from the plain meaning of the statute, courts need not pursue statutory interpretation”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “where the intent of the legislature is clear from the plain meaning of the statute, courts need not pursue statutory interpretation”
- "[qlualifying words do not extend to or include other words, phrases, or clauses more remote, unless such extension or inclusion is clearly required by the intent or meaning of the context or disclosed by an examination of the entire act”
- observing "the well established cannon of construction that courts should generally apply qualifying words or phrases to the words immediately preceding them"
- observing that only when the language of the statute is ambiguous does statutory construction under 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) become necessary
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring and dissenting.
I join in the majority’s holding that Section 610(1) of the SWMA embodies an absolute liability offense that, by its terms, is intended to apply to all persons, including individual employees. See 35 P.S. §§ 6018.610(1), 6018.611. I am less comfortable, however, with the majority’s assessment of the constitutional issues involved. In this regard, I would acknowledge the admonition of the United States Supreme Court that “offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605-06 , 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1797 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (citation omitted). Further, I would not suggest that a violation of Section 610 constitutes a traditional public welfare offense, one type of crime as to which strict liability has been deemed acceptable, since such offenses are characterized by minimal penalties and impact upon reputation. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 616 , 114 S.Ct. at 1802 . By contrast, a first-time violation of Section 610 *497 of the SWMA is a third-degree misdemeanor and carries potential penalties of up to one year in prison and a fine of at least $1,000 and up to $25,000 per day for each violation. See 35 P.S. § 6018.606(b).
Recently, in a concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Samuels, 566 Pa. 109 , 778 A.2d 638 (2001), I discussed considerations attendant to the designation of a crime as a strict or absolute liability offense consistent with the due process precepts. See Samuels, 566 Pa. at 113-50 , 778 A.2d at 641-62 (Saylor, J., concurring). In attempting to evaluate such principles against the circumstances of the present case, however, a full review is hindered by the absence from the original record of the trial court’s jury charge. 1 The trial court’s instructions to the jurors are particularly important in the present context, since, for example, some courts have ameliorated constitutional concerns in relation to strict liability offenses in their jury charges by permitting jurors to consider various forms and degrees of affirmative defenses. See, e.g., State v. Holte, 631 N.W.2d 595, 598 (N.D.2001) (“We ... have permitted an affirmative defense to a strict liability offense as ‘a logical accommodation which recognizes the reasons for both the legislative designation of the crimes as strict liability offenses and the constitutional interests of the accused.’ ”). 2 Given the magnitude of the questions involved, particularly in light of the increased prevalence of strict liability offenses in Pennsylvania’s criminal law, see generally Samuels, 566 Pa. at *498 145-46 , 778 A.2d at 661-62 (Saylor, J., concurring), I view it as critical for these questions to be decided based upon a full and complete appellate presentation.
Appellee was the appellant in the Commonwealth Court and therefore charged with the obligation of presenting an adequate record to the appellate courts, 3 see Pa.R.A.P.1911(a). As I find the record deficient, I would merely reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court based upon the statutory analysis presented by the majority, while reserving decision on the constitutional questions concerning application of Section 610(1) of the SWMA in the absence of mens rea (and/or the availability of limited affirmative defenses) for a case in which an adequate record is presented.
. Transcripts from the proceedings are labeled “excerpt of proceeding,” and were apparently prepared according to designations by the parties.
. In this regard, it is significant that there is no factual assertion on the record presented that Appellant did not know that the act of burying tires was not authorized by a permit issued by the Department or was otherwise illegal. Rather, his testimony focused on the claim that he was removing previously buried tires from an excavation site. There was, therefore, no evidentiary predicate for consideration of a general affirmative defense instruction based upon complete lack of scienter. Appellant's better argument is that the jury may have believed that he was removing tires, but nevertheless found him strictly liable under the statute based upon his concession that he inadvertently knocked several tires back into the site while working. However, due to the deficiencies in the record presented, I cannot determine whether the instructions given to the jury would have allowed for conviction on such grounds.
. In this regard, it should be noted that Appellee has not proceeded in forma pauperis.