The opinion
CONREY, P. J.,
Concurring.—I concur in the judgment., solely on the ground that the facts pleaded, proved and found establish the existence of notice to defendants of the dangerous condition from which the accident originated, and because, therefore, the plaintiff had a cause of action coming within the conditions required by Act No. 5619. Notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court in Ahern v. Livermore Union High School District, 208 Cal. 770 [ 284 Pac. 1105 ], and unless that decision is the final word on the subject, I am of the opinion that where the negligence relied upon relates to the dangerous or defective condition of public property, there can be no cause of action without the notice or knowledge required under the terms provided in Act No. 5619. It seems to me that the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Preston (concurred in by Justices Richards and Shenk) correctly stated the law when he said that “a substantive right of action in such case is controlled by Act No. 5619 of the General Law”. But let it be conceded that a right of action for injuries caused to a pupil by reason of negligence in maintaining a defective or otherwise dangerous condition of school property, as well as injuries *404 resulting from other descriptions of negligence, was authorized by section 1623 of the Political Code and is now authorized by section 2.801 of the School Code. Yet I see no reason why the legislature might not concurrently provide, as it did, that where the injury arises out of a dangerous or defective condition of public property (amy public property), the right of action shall be limited to cases where there was knowledge or notice such as the Act No. 5619 requires. To hold otherwise, results in giving a preference to one class of litigants. Thereby other litigants, seeking the same relief and for the identical description of injury, are deprived of “the equal protection of the laws”.