noting when trial court’s action is untenable it is an abuse of discretion
How later courts described this case
- noting when trial court’s action is untenable it is an abuse of discretion
- discretion that is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds is an abuse of discretion
- "Where the decision or order of the trial court is a matter of discretion, it will not be disturbed on review except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons."
- superseded by statute on other grounds by, Seattle Times Co v. Benton County, 661 P.2d 964, 99 Wn.2d 251 (1983)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Finley, J.
(special concurrence in dissent) — I have signed and concur in the dissenting opinion by Williams, J. Pro Tern., because its reasoning or logic seems to me well nigh irrefutable. In particular, my concurring views can practically be put in a nutshell — I hope not an unnecessarily large or ponderous one. First, the key and crucial sentence of RCW 71.02.250 reads: “All files in these cases shall be closed files subject to examination only on court order: . . .”. (Italics mine.) Second, the trial court, per Judge Ringold, in fact, issued an order authorizing the project of Professor Junker and his associates. Third, although not required by the statute, the order of Judge Ringold provided explicitly that anonymity and confidentiality would be preserved by the researchers as to the names — of the individuals — i.e., the subjects of the mental illness files. Further, there is no proof whatsoever that this significant protective provision of Judge Ringold’s order has been or even was about to be violated. Considering the first sentence of the statute, certainly in the light of the particular circumstances just mentioned, should put an end to this matter. In this context, and I think it is a realistic one, the fears and alarms of petitioners have something in common with an exercise in pyrotechnics involving considerable smoke but little or no fire. Likewise, I think, the majority views and result do well to escape a “much ado* about nothing” category.
Perhaps it would have been better, and something may *40 be said, for the contention that Judge Ringold should not have heard and ruled on objections to his order. But, there is nothing new or novel or innately 'and conclusively improper or wrong in trial judges hearing and ruling upon objections made every day in the courts of this state to a great variety of orders made by them in a great variety of legal proceedings. Any needed safety valve in such instances, as in the instant case, is amply provided for by existing appellate or other judicial review. If the fountain of justice is to be kept pure and meaningful in serving the legitimate social aspirations and needs of all people, the law and its purported social ends must be subject at least periodically to careful scrutiny and evaluation. This, I believe, is the objective of the project by Professor Junker and his associates.
Thus, it seems to me quite compelling that the order issued by Judge Ringold was clearly authorized by the first sentence of RCW 71.02.250. The order for a temporary injunction should be dissolved and the order of Judge Ringold authorizing the research study and evaluation of mental illness proceedings should be sustained and 'affirmed by this court.
Neill, J., and Williams, J. Pro Tern., concur with Finley, J.