noting the county’s contention that “its signing should be evaluated according to a ‘reasonable’ professional engineering judgment standard rather than a ‘reasonable person under the circumstances’ test”
How later courts described this case
- noting the county’s contention that “its signing should be evaluated according to a ‘reasonable’ professional engineering judgment standard rather than a ‘reasonable person under the circumstances’ test”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McCORMICK, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result and all of the opinion except division III. I agree with Wigmore’s view that “[t]he hypothetical question, misused by the clumsy and abused by the clever, has in practice led to intolerable suppression of truth.” 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 686, at 812 (3d ed. 1940). I would adopt the standard delineated in Fed.R.Evid. 705:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
See Rabata v. Dohner, 45 Wis.2d 111 , 172 N.W.2d 409 (1969); C. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 36 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972): 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 705[1] (1978).
HARRIS, J., joins this special concurrence.