Opinion

Commonwealth v. Zaengle

  • 332 Pa. Super. 137
  • 480 A.2d 1224
  • 1984 Pa. Super. LEXIS 5887
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Aug 10, 1984
Status
Published
Author
Olszewski
On the bench
Olszewski, Wickersham, Hoffman
Cited by
10 cases
Authority
More cited than 4.9%

multiple sentences for single unlawful act

How later courts described this case

  • multiple sentences for single unlawful act

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

OLSZEWSKI, Judge, dissenting:

The majority today has concluded that no more than a single sentence may be imposed for multiple counts of homicide arising from a single accident — regardless of the fact that each count represents a separate and unique life lost as a result of that accident. I respectfully dissent.

To reach that conclusion, the majority relies on a long line of Pennsylvania cases which hold that, in cases of involuntary manslaughter where more than one person is killed in a single accident, only one sentence may be imposed. E.g., Commonwealth v. Guiliano, 274 Pa.Super. 419 , 418 A.2d 476 (1980); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 256 Pa.Super. 259 , *146 389 A.2d 1113 (1978). The rationale which underlies the rule is that a single criminal act results in a single injury to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Ernesto, 93 Pa.Super. 339 (1928). The court notes that homicide by vehicle requires a lesser degree of culpability than that necessary to establish involuntary manslaughter, See Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345 , 437 A.2d 385 (1981). Applying the logic that the greater includes the lesser, it finds impermissible multiple sentences on multiple counts of homicide by vehicle.

The majority’s analysis fails because it starts with a faulty premise. It assumes that homicide by vehicle and involuntary manslaughter are but varied degrees of the same offense. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has distinguished the two on the basis of the “vehicle statute’s distinct purpose of reducing highway fatalities.” Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344 , 348 n. 5, 466 A.2d 613 , 615 n. 5 (1983); see 75 Pa.C.S. Sec. 1532 (conviction for homicide by vehicle results in revocation of a driver’s license for one year, while conviction for involuntary manslaughter results in no conviction).

We agree with the lower court that nothing in the Vehicle Code suggests a legislative intent to expose the defendant who commits multiple homicides by vehicle to prosecution for each death — but to shield him from punishment for all but one of those deaths. Supp. op. at 17. In this case, appellant’s involuntary intoxication resulted in the untimely deaths of three people. As the lower court explained in its excellent opinion,

each life is of infinite value not only to the individual and his or her family but also to the Commonwealth, and consequently the taking of that lie necessarily constitutes a separate and distinct injury to all those affected by that death, including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id. For these reasons, 1 we would affirm the judgment below.

. The Vehicle Code was amended by the Act of December 15, 1982, P.L. 1268, to create a new offense, homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, 75 Pa.C.S.Sec. 3735. The statute prescribes a *147 mandatory prison term of not less than three years. The amendment took effect on January 14, 1983, after the occurence of the offense alleged in this case.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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