holding that exceptional sentences do not need to be proportional in length to the standard sentence
How later courts described this case
- holding that exceptional sentences do not need to be proportional in length to the standard sentence
- upholding a 26-year sentence for the rape of a 6 1/2- week-old baby by a defendant who had an offender score of 0 and who penetrated the baby with his little finger
- upholding a 26-year sentence for the rape of a 6 ½-week-old baby by a defendant who had an offender score of 0 and who penetrated the baby with his little finger
- upholding an 84-month sentence for second degree assault despite it being nine times greater than the high end of the standard range
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash. 2d 1 (1996)
See State v. George, 67 Wash.App. 217, 221-22, 834 P.2d 664 (1992) (stating that vulnerability due to advanced age may alone, as a matter of law, justify an exceptional sentence in robbery, assault, and rape of 77-year-old woman), review denied, 120 Wash.2d 1023, 844 P.2d 1018 (1993), overruled on other grounds, State v. Ritchie, 126 Wash.2d 388, 395, 894 P.2d 1308 (1995), overruled on other grounds, State v. Cardena…
Abrogated by State v. O'Dell, 183 Wash. 2d 680 (2015)
126 Wn.2d 388 , 894 P.2d 1308 (1995), abrogated by O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680
The opinion
Guy, J.
(concurring in the dissent) — I concur with Justice Madsen that trial courts must articulate reasons for the length of an exceptional sentence imposed. Inherent in the exercise of discretion is a reasoned decision on why use of that power is appropriate. The dissent would require the sentencing judge to state his or her reason for imposing an exceptional sentence. I agree, for without such a statement we are unable to determine whether the power was abused. Since a sentencing judge does not decide to apply an exceptional sentence without thinking about what sentence is appropriate, it is not a burden on the judge to provide on the record his or her thinking as to the appropriateness of the sentence.
Justice Madsen’s discussion of the purpose of the SRA and the need for an appellate court to review the written basis for imposing an exceptional sentence is clear and well stated. I do not concur with the dissent in the discussion of proportionality or the doubling rule.
I join with Justice Madsen in concluding that the sentences of Defendants Ritchie and Hamrick are clearly excessive and should be remanded for resentencing. In the case of Defendant Scott, before an evaluation under abuse of discretion standards can be made, the record must contain the reasons for the sentence imposed.