Opinion

State v. Moore

  • 324 Or. 396
  • 927 P.2d 1073
  • 1996 Ore. LEXIS 128
Court
Oregon Supreme Court
Filed
Dec 6, 1996
Status
Published
Author
Fadeley
On the bench
Carson, C.J., and Gillette, Van Hoomissen, Fadeley, Graber and Durham
Cited by
77 cases
Authority
More cited than 4.9%

concluding that ORS 163.150(l)(b)(D) allows for meaningful judicial review of jury’s decision to impose death sentence and rejecting defendant’s argument that Due Process Clause requires “excessiveness” review in death-penalty cases

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that ORS 163.150(l)(b)(D) allows for meaningful judicial review of jury’s decision to impose death sentence and rejecting defendant’s argument that Due Process Clause requires “excessiveness” review in death-penalty cases
  • holding that the weighing of probative value against consideration of the cumulative nature of the evi- dence occurs only if it is determined that the evidence is Nonprecedential Memo Op: 351 Or App 238 (2026) 241 cumulative
  • explaining and applying Dawson in case involving penalty-phase evidence of defendant’s belief in white supremacy; evidence of defendant’s specific beliefs and related conduct admissible because probative of future dangerousness, which was at issue
  • explaining that “any instruction that appeals to the jurors’ sympathies also must instruct the jurors that such sympathy must be based upon the mitigating evidence before them”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by State v. Washington, 355 Or. 612 (2014)

    Defendant argues that Moen and Moore are distinguishable because they involve instructions regarding sympathy, not mercy, which defendant insists is different.
    Oregon Supreme CourtJun 19, 2014Read it

The opinion

FADELEY, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent because of the majority’s rulings that evidence of political beliefs and passing out a “political pamphlet” is admissible in evidence with respect to future dangerousness in this case. 324 Or at 417.

I do not agree that labeling a person’s social or political beliefs should be permitted in the death-penalty phase of an aggravated murder case, however aberrant or abhorrent those beliefs may be, or that evidence of passing out a political pamphlet should be so admitted. The label “neo-Nazi” is not merely cumulative of another type of labeling, i.e., “white supremacist.” Those terms may convey different, but still prejudicial, thoughts to a juror. Basing future dangerousness on political beliefs (rather than on violent conduct) is a net that, from the point of view of King George III, would have caught at least some of the founders of this country who expressed themselves against the colonial government in their time. The founders sought to leave all that behind. We should heed their lesson.

Further, I do not see that evidence of defendant’s social or political beliefs is “tied in any way to the murder” 1 of defendant’s wife’s parents. That was not a political act but was a family affair. The family, not political beliefs, is the source of the passion and anger here.

I respectfully dissent.

The wording quoted is from Dawson v. Delaware, 503 US 159, 166 , 112 S Ct 1093 , 117 L Ed 2d 309 (1992).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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