holding that article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution “is substantially identical with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment”
How later courts described this case
- holding that article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution “is substantially identical with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment”
- trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to waive sheriffs fees, finding that appellant’s interest in obtaining execution of judgment was outweighed by sheriff’s statutory right to indemnification
- statutes proscribing different degrees of punishment for the same activity violate equal protection
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979)
Batchelder overruled Pirkey and Olsen
Distinguished
Distinguished by Jansen v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 258 (1976)
Olsen v. Delmore, supra, is distinguishable inasmuch as such dealt with statutes which permitted charging either a misdemeanor or felony for an identical offense.
Distinguished by State v. Zornes, 78 Wash. 2d 9 (1970)
We distinguished Olsen v. Delmore, supra. That case, we said, held that where one statute vested in the prosecutor the power to proceed for either a gross misdemeanor or a felony for the identical act, the defendant’s right to equal protection of the laws was violated.
The opinion
Hill, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. Whether an offense is to be classed as a felony or as a misdemeanor is determined by the maximum sentence which might be imposed under the statute. State v. Bowser (1942), 155 Kan. 723 , 129 P. (2d) 268 . For other cases, see annotation, 95 A. L. R. 1115. The maximum penalty under the uniform firearms act is imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than ten years. Laws of 1935, chapter 172, § 16, p. 604 (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2516-16 [cf. RCW 9.41.160]). Ergo, a violation of the uniform firearms act is a felony.
If, as the majority says, the act gives prosecuting attorneys the right to choose whether they will prosecute for a gross misdemeanor or for a felony, I agree that it is unconstitutional; but I do not believe that it does.
The majority reaches its conclusion primarily on the basis of the penalty provision, which reads:
“Any violation of any provision of this act constitutes an offense punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) or imprisonment for not more than one year in the county jail or both, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than ten years.” (Italics ours.) Laws of 1935, chapter 172, § 16, p. 604.
*552 The majority says: “This seems to be a pretty clear indication that the legislature thereby intended to vest in prosecuting officials the discretion to charge as for either a gross misdemeanor or a felony.” The result: an unconstitutional act.
. To me, the language quoted seems only to indicate that the legislature intended to vest trial judges with a wide latitude in the matter of the punishment to be inflicted for violations of the act. The result: a constitutional act.
Where a statute is capable of two constructions, one of which would render it invalid and the other valid, the construction which will uphold its validity must be adopted. State ex rel. Campbell v. Case (1935), 182 Wash. 334 , 47 P. (2d) 24 .
In my opinion, a violation of our uniform firearms act is clearly a felony, and a prosecuting attorney has no more authority to charge a violation of that act as a misdemeanor than he has to charge manslaughter (Laws of 1909, chapter 249, § 143, p. 931 (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2395 [cf. RCW 9.48-.060])), negligent homicide (Laws of 1937, chapter 189, § 120, p. 911 (Rem. Rev. Stat., Vol. 7A, § 6360-120 [cf. RCW 46.56.040])) or any other felony as a misdemeanor.
The fact — if it be a fact, and there is no evidence of it before us — that some prosecuting attorneys charge violations of the uniform firearms act as misdemeanors does not make them so, nor does their mistake in so doing render the act unconstitutional. The question is: Does the act authorize an alternative charge, a misdemeanor or a felony? As I read the act, there is no such authority.
The petitioner was properly charged with a felony. The writ should be denied.
Finley, Weaver, and Ott, JJ., concur with Hill, J.
May 9, 1956. Petition for rehearing denied.