holding medical malpractice insurance requirements existing "[a]t the time of the malpractice alleged by the plaintiff" were adequate to support amendment eliminating vicarious liability claims against doctors' employers because quid pro quo would have been sufficient if amendment was part of original Act
How later courts described this case
- holding medical malpractice insurance requirements existing "[a]t the time of the malpractice alleged by the plaintiff" were adequate to support amendment eliminating vicarious liability claims against doctors' employers because quid pro quo would have been sufficient if amendment was part of original Act
- reasoning mandatory liability insurance minimums were "a sizeable quid pro quo . . . and certainly [were] an adequate substitute remedy for the common-law rights given up by injured malpractice victims."
- holding medical malpractice minimums provided substitute remedy for abrogation of vicarious liability claim against health care provider's employer
- abrogation of vicarious liability between health care providers if they are both covered by the Act
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Miller v. Johnson, 295 Kan. 636 (2012)
248 Kan. 824 , 811 P.2d 1176 (1991), and abrogated on other grounds by Miller, 295 Kan. 636
The opinion
Herd, J.,
dissenting: I am apprehensive about our step-by-step retreat from constitutional principles with a convenient technique of rationalizing equal protection and ignoring the required quid pro quo required as a substitute for a “remedy by due course of law.” Thus, our written constitution loses its meaning and affords no barrier to the enactment of unjust laws resulting from the transitory public pressures of the moment. Therefore, I dissent.
Lockett, J., joins the foregoing dissent.