The opinion
MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, with whom MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARD joins, dissenting:
Mr. Chief Justice Ward and I dissent, and would affirm the judgment of the circuit court. In our opinion the majority has ignored the explicit language and misconstrued the intent and purpose of section 10 — 2 of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 46, par. 10—2).
The Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 46, par. 1—1 et seq.) provides a comprehensive scheme both for the nomination of candidates by political parties and independent candidates. Insofar as is pertinent here, section 7-2 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 46, par. 7—2) provides that a political party is one which, at the election for town officers next preceding the primary, cast more than five percent of the entire vote cast in the town. Article 10 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 46, par. 10—1 et seq.) provides the manner of making nominations by a “new political party,” that is, one which has not qualified by receiving more than five percent of the entire vote cast within the township in the election next preceding the primary. If it casts the required five percent of the entire vote, the “new political party” becomes an “established political party” and thereafter the nomination of its candidates is governed by the provisions of article 7 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 46, par. 7—1 et seq.). Section 10 — 3 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 46, par. 10—3) provides for the method of nominating independent candidates.
Such matters as the order of candidates’ names on ballots (Huff v. State Board of Elections, 57 Ill. 2d 74 ) and the status of nominees named in group nominating petitions in the allocation of those ballot positions (Bradley v. Landing, 63 Ill. 2d 91 ) are widely believed to be of importance to candidates and have recently been considered by this court. Similarly, certain advantages are believed to stem from the association of candidates in a political party as distinguished from running as independents. It has been suggested that among these advantages is the availability of the combined efforts of the candidates and their supporters for the election of the entire slate, the savings which can be effected by joint advertising and the employment of workers, and the fact that a voter, by marking the appropriate circle at the top of the column, casts a ballot for the entire ticket.
Obviously, it was the legislative intent that candidates who sought the advantages believed to result from association in a political party meet certain requirements, one of which is that the petition for the formation of such party “shall contain a complete list of candidates of such party for all offices to be filled in the *** political subdivision *** at the next ensuing election then to be held; *** ” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 46, par. 10—2). Nothing in the majority opinion serves to render this requirement unreasonable or unconstitutional.
The majority states that “[s] ection 10 — 2 contains no language authorizing the board to remove qualified candidates because a candidate for another office is found to be ineligible” (67 Ill. 2d at 176) and then proceeds to discuss at great length constitutional issues which are not presented by this record. We were not here confronted, nor were we required to decide, whether the individual petitioners were entitled to remain on the ballot as independent candidates. Their prayer for relief asked only that the defendant be ordered to print the names of the individual petitioners and the Independent Township Caucus Party on the official ballot and sought no alternative relief. Had such alternative relief been sought and denied there might conceivably be some reason for the lengthy and, under these circumstances, completely unnecessary, constitutional discussion in the majority opinion. The majority also appears to conclude that the requirement for a complete list of candidates can, in some manner, be distinguished from “ ‘a complete list of eligible candidates.’ ” (67 Ill. 2d at 179.) It does not appear unreasonable that a group purporting to form a new political party be required to determine that its candidates are qualified to run for the offices they seek. Under the rationale of the majority opinion a new political party could field a slate of candidates knowing that all but one of them were ineligible and thus achieve the bizarre result of placing on the ballot a “new political party” with a single candidate. To thus flout the legislative intent so clearly demonstrated by the explicit statutory provisions is violative of the established rules for the construction of statutes.