finding that any effort to distinguish the admissibility of evidence of a victim’s behavior toward a defendant and expert testimony about the effects of such behavior on the defendant is “untenable”
How later courts described this case
- finding that any effort to distinguish the admissibility of evidence of a victim’s behavior toward a defendant and expert testimony about the effects of such behavior on the defendant is “untenable”
- “preferred term among many experts today is ‘expert testimony on battering and its effects’ or ‘expert testimony on battered women’s experience’ ”
- To effectively present the situation as perceived by the [victim], and the reasonableness of her fear, [they] have the option to explain [their] feelings to enable the jury to overcome stereotyped impressions about women who remain in abusive relationships (quoting State v Allery 682 P 2d 312 316 (Wash 1984))
- “[M]any battered women remain in the relationship because of lack of money, social isolation, lack of self-confidence, inadequate police response, and a fear (often justified) of reprisals by the batterer.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WERDEGAR, J., Concurring.
Like Justice Brown, I agree with the majority’s general conclusions but believe the instructional question calls for a *1092 more specific analysis of the relationship between expert testimony and a claim of reasonable self-defense. For the reasons explained in Justice Brown’s concurring opinion, expert testimony regarding battered woman’s syndrome is not relevant to the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense unless the defendant’s claim of reasonableness is based upon facts that would not, outside of a battering relationship, tend to show the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in the need to use deadly force. (Conc. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 1098.)
Although not explicitly stated in Justice Brown’s opinion, it follows that in cases not meeting this description—cases, that is, in which the claim of reasonable belief is not dependent on expert testimony as to the nature of a battering relationship—a trial court would not err by giving a limiting instruction of the type suggested in People v. Aris (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1199 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 167 ], and given in the instant case. Nor would a court err in any case by limiting the jury’s use of battered woman’s syndrome (BWS) evidence on the question of reasonableness to that aspect of the expert testimony actually relating to the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense.
I part company from Justice Brown insofar as her analysis depends upon Evidence Code section 801. (See conc. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 1095.) Evidence Code section 1107 declares BWS evidence admissible, when offered by the defense, upon a foundation of relevance and proper qualification of the expert witness. The Legislature has thus commanded BWS be treated as a proper subject for expert testimony, whether or not it would otherwise meet the generally applicable test of Evidence Code section 801.