stating, "Objectively, [the suspect] surely had no reason to suspect that his conversation with a suspected accomplice in the back of the police car would be afforded any kind of confidentiality”
How later courts described this case
- stating, "Objectively, [the suspect] surely had no reason to suspect that his conversation with a suspected accomplice in the back of the police car would be afforded any kind of confidentiality”
- arrested suspect did not have a reasonable expectation that he could conduct a private conversation with an accomplice in the back seat of a police car, even though the two had been left alone
- defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy while seated in back seat of police car with accomplice so that surreptitious tape-recording of their conversation was admissible in evidence
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by People v. Myers, 5 Cal. 4th 1193 (1993)
33 Cal.3d 623, 629 (Crowson), overruled on another ground in People v. Myers (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1193, 1195, 1201
Overruled — as noted by 2 later courts
(See Johnson, supra, 233 Cal. App.3d at p. 1547 ["In light of the discussion in Guerrero, we would have no difficulty concluding that the Crowson rule is no longer good law"]; Tuggle, supra, 232 Cal. App.3d at p. 156 ["Guerrero is admittedly somewhat at odds with cases such as ...
2 citing opinions
The opinion
RICHARDSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur with the majority opinion to the extent that it affirms defendant’s robbery and burglary convictions. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s further conclusion that defendant’s sentence may not be enhanced by reason of his prior federal felony conviction.
The obvious purpose of Penal Code section 667.5 is to enhance the terms of recidivist felony offenders; under that provision, offenses committed in other jurisdictions “count” for enhancement purposes if they would be considered felonies in this state. (Subd. (f).) Here, defendant pleaded guilty to a federal drug conspiracy indictment alleging the commission of two overt acts. Would this offense be deemed a felony under California law? It seems to me clear that it would.
The majority speculates that the prior offense might not have involved any overt acts, despite the indictment’s contrary allegations. If that were indeed true, why would defendant have entered his guilty plea? As the majority concedes, although some federal cases appear to have dispensed with the overt act requirement, numerous cases from the Ninth Circuit (wherein defendant was charged) strongly suggest that the commission of overt acts remains an essential element of a federal drug conspiracy offense. (Ante, p. 631 and cases cited.) *637 That being so, we may reasonably assume that defendant’s guilty plea admitted the overt act allegations.
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.