holding that in the absence of any clear intent by the legislature that a defendant could be convicted of more than one kind of first-degree murder where there is only one victim, the rule of lenity requires that the first-degree murder statute be construed in favor of the defendant
How later courts described this case
- holding that in the absence of any clear intent by the legislature that a defendant could be convicted of more than one kind of first-degree murder where there is only one victim, the rule of lenity requires that the first-degree murder statute be construed in favor of the defendant
- concluding that a person could not be convicted of two murder convictions for a single victim because 8 the legislature had not manifested “any clear intent that a defendant could be convicted of more than one kind of first-degree murder where there is but one victim”
- finding that prosecution should be permitted to proceed to jury findings on multiple theories of first-degree murder of the same victim, even though defendant may be convicted of only one first-degree murder
- holding that jury should be informed that defendant was being charged with one crime under two alternative theories and that verdict should indicate which theory had been proved by the evidence
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Callis v. People, 692 P.2d 1045 (1985)
660 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Colo. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by, Callis v. People, 692 P.2d 1045
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. James, 1984 Colo. App. LEXIS 1312 (1984)
People v. Lee, supra, and People v. Lowe, supra, are inapposite because they hold that a general verdict is invalid if any one of the alternative theories submitted is constitutionally infirm.
The opinion
LOHR, Justice,
specially concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the court. I believe, however, that the majority opinion that a person may be convicted of only one charge of murder for the killing of one victim is soundly grounded in statutory interpretation. It is unnecessary to this decision to discuss the exceedingly difficult constitutional doctrine of double jeopardy, and I think it inadvisable to do so.