applying this analysis in an assault and battery with a dangerous weapon case under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A, and noting that the fact that the assault was in the context of consensual sexual conduct was immaterial
How later courts described this case
- applying this analysis in an assault and battery with a dangerous weapon case under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A, and noting that the fact that the assault was in the context of consensual sexual conduct was immaterial
- “the question whether a weapon is dangerous as used is always one for the fact finder”
- "Once an actor intends to commit assault with an object capable of causing bodily harm, he is threatening to use the instrumentality in a dangerous fashion.” (footnote omitted)
- assault and battery by means of dangerous weapon requires “intentional, unjustified touching, however slight, by means of [a] dangerous weapon”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Hennessey, C.J.
(concurring). I concur with the result and the reasoning of the court’s opinion. I add these few *313 words to bring emphasis to the court’s expressed “reservation” as to the severity of the sentence imposed. The only incident which resulted in a guilty verdict was minor. It was a blow which “barely connected” with the victim’s back; it was a “glancing blow,” with no evidence of visible injury or after effects. We may speculate that the sentencing process was perhaps influenced by the indictments as to two more serious episodes of violence. However, the jury, by their not guilty verdicts, rejected those charges, and as a consequence they would have no proper bearing on the sentence. Perhaps the sentence here was unduly influenced by knowledge of other charges pending against the defendant at the time of this trial. Perhaps, also, the sentence was influenced by certain related circumstances which are abhorrent to most persons, but the defendant was not charged with those circumstances in any indictment. In sum, the sentencing result here is one which focuses on the compelling need for reasoned application of the broad sentencing discretion ordinarily available to our trial court.