prohibiting candidate from being designated on ballot as “Independent” was substantial restriction of political expression and association protected by arts. 1 and 16, unjustified by any legitimate State interest
How later courts described this case
- prohibiting candidate from being designated on ballot as “Independent” was substantial restriction of political expression and association protected by arts. 1 and 16, unjustified by any legitimate State interest
- “There is certainly much useful information about parties and candidates that a State is free not to mention or elicit on the ballot, even if physical limitations do not prevent [it].”
- "As a substantial restriction of political expression and association . . . the legislation at bar should attract 'strict scrutiny'"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Braucher, J.
(dissenting). The injunction in this case was issued on short notice, without adequate time for consideration, and on the basis of “agreed facts” of dubious reliability, hastily thrown together by counsel. In a case of first impression, the result was to give constitutional status to the linguistic preferences of the Justices, and to exempt the plaintiff from a rule adopted by the elected representatives of the people. Thus the case stands as an example of premature, unnecessary, and mischievous judicial interference with democratic procedures.
On reflection, moreover, I am convinced that constitutional principles have been misapplied. The court seems to *282 recognize that reasonable regulation of the form and content of the ballot is essential to the conduct of an election; there is no need to treat control of misleading ballot designations like censorship of works of art. The Legislature could rationally conclude that “Independent” is an “ambiguous designation.” See Libertarian Party v. Eu, 102 Cal. App. 3d 446 , 457 (1980). Cf. Shaw v. Johnson, 311 Minn. 237, 240 (1976), where, in the absence of statute, the court found no danger of confusion between “independent” and “ Independent-Republican. ” The Legislature could further conclude that use of the label “ Independent” tended to foster misrepresentation andt confusion. Remedies to assure that “independent” candidates are “truly independent” have had mixed success. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 746 (1974); Minnesota Fifth Congressional Dist. Independent-Republican Party v. State ex rel. Spannaus, 295 N.W. 2d 650, 653 (Minn. 1980). If the Legislature determined that prohibition of use of the label on the ballot would not impose a serious disadvantage on the candidate, I think it could impose the prohibition. Rational determinations of the Legislature are not to be overthrown merely by findings that they are contrary to fact, much less by “agreed facts” or judicial omniscience. Certainly the fact that candidates were permitted to use imaginative “soubriquets” does not warrant a refusal to take the legislative determination seriously.
The cases cited by the court deal with a variety of subjects: access to the ballot, limitation of campaign expenditures or tactics, a schism in a regular party organization, preferential ballot position, compulsory ballot designations, and others. The present decision involves none of these. It is truly unprecedented.