“The statute does not require that a final verdict be had within [the 120 day] limit, only that the trial commence.”
How later courts described this case
- “The statute does not require that a final verdict be had within [the 120 day] limit, only that the trial commence.”
- "Jury selection is an intrinsic part of the trial process."
- affirming Bowie’s conviction in first degree murder of victim Melvin Traylor
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PARKS, Judge,
specially concurring:
Although I concur with the outcome of this case, I feel compelled to write separately to further address appellant’s proposition of error concerning the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
First, appellant contends that his trial did not commence within the mandatory 120 day limit set by Art. IV(c) of the Agreement because the jury had not been sworn *1149 within that period. However, it is well settled law in Oklahoma that for all purposes except attachment of jeopardy, the trial commences when jury selection begins. Cables v. State, 3 Okl.Cr. 72 , 104 P. 493 (1909); Simmons v. State, 4 Okl.Cr. 490 , 114 P. 752 (1910). Although the I AD did not exist at the time this general rule was established, I would apply the rule to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
Second, appellant contends that the time limitation of the IAD was violated because his first trial resulted in a mistrial and the second trial was not timely. I agree with the majority that Wilkett does not stand for the proposition that the state must return a defendant to federal custody after each mistrial. To require this would merely waste resources.
It is also important to note that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers does not address the issue of what result must be reached if the detainee’s trial ends in a mistrial and the 120 day limitation has since expired. Additionally, it appears that there is no case law on point. Therefore, I feel the interests of justice would be met by holding that where, as here, a mistrial is not attributable to the prosecution and the second proceeding commences as soon as practicable after the first, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is not violated. Such a holding would allow the State to conserve resources and would assure the defendant a speedy trial.