finding no federal constitutional right to counsel to collaterally attack a judgment but noting its precedent that “if a petition attacking the validity of a judgment states a prima facie case leading to issuance of an order to show cause, the appointment of counsel is demanded by due process concerns”
How later courts described this case
- finding no federal constitutional right to counsel to collaterally attack a judgment but noting its precedent that “if a petition attacking the validity of a judgment states a prima facie case leading to issuance of an order to show cause, the appointment of counsel is demanded by due process concerns”
- holding that “absent justification for the failure to present all known claims in a single, timely petition for writ of habeas cor- pus, successive and/or untimely petitions will be summarily denied”
- adopting a threshold standard in addition to the standard recommended by Justice White in his concurrence
- stating that “a petitioner must explain and justify any substantial delay in presenting a claim”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Briggs v. Brown
5 Cal.4th 750, 783, fn. 20 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 842
Superseded on other grounds by In re Friend, 280 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (2021)
5 Cal. 4th 750, 775 (1993) (“If a petitioner had reason to suspect that a basis 19 for habeas corpus relief was available, but did nothing to promptly confirm those suspicions, that 20 failure must be justified.”), superseded on other grounds by In re Friend, 11 Cal. 5th 720
Questioned by In Re Robbins, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153 (1998)
” Although this characterization of counsel’s investigative duties before Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 750, has been questioned (see id. at p. 800 (cone. opn. of Lucas, C. J.)), we need not resolve that issue here, because petitioner has failed to allege with specificity facts showing that the information offered in support of the Holmes subclaim was not known to him earlier than mid-June 1995.
The opinion
*802 MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the judgment.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus before this court collaterally attacks a judgment of death. In the words of Justice Holmes, the Great Writ “cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside, . . . and although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty shell.” (Frank v. Mangum (1915) 237 U.S. 309, 346 [ 59 L.Ed. 969, 987-988 , 35 S.Ct. 582 ] (dis. opn. of Holmes, J.).) With that understanding, I have carefully reviewed the petition. After such scrutiny, I have concluded that it lacks merit. I would accordingly deny relief on that basis.
In all other respects, I dissent.
The majority do all that they can to tear the heart out of the Great Writ and to put in its place a knot of lifeless technicalities. Of course, they are condemned to failure. For the writ is greater than individual judges.
At first, the majority’s excursus into California habeas procedure seems strange. Why do they write so many confused and confusing pages on this topic when they could deny the petition on the merits in a short and simple opinion?
On reflection, at least one of the majority’s purposes becomes manifest. They seek to prevent federal courts from reviewing federal constitutional claims, especially in capital cases. Success in this endeavor turns on the adequacy and independence of any state procedural bar. (See, e.g., Harris v. Reed (1989) 489 U.S. 255, 260-262 [ 103 L.Ed.2d 308, 315-316 , 109 S.Ct. 1038 ].) For its part, adequacy presupposes the regular and consistent application of the bar. (See, e.g., Dugger v. Adams (1989) 489 U.S. 401, 410, fn. 6 [ 103 L.Ed.2d 435, 445 , 109 S.Ct. 1211 ].) Regularity and consistency, however, were not evident in the past. As the majority all but expressly concede, before today procedural “rules” were discretionary: they were invoked or not with a view toward furthering the interests of justice in the individual case. Regularity and consistency are not likely to present themselves in the future. The majority’s procedural “rules” are indeterminate at their very core. As such, they lend themselves only to arbitrary and capricious operation.
Having said all that, I do not wish to be understood to tolerate abuse of the Great Writ. During almost 30 years on this court, I have refused to allow such conduct. I will not permit it now. But I know of only one sure way to discover abuse without defeating justice: to examine each petition on its own *803 facts. True, scrutiny of this sort requires the expense of considerable judicial resources, particularly in capital cases. That, however, is the cost of justice. Out of fidelity to our judicial oath, we must pay the price. I have and I shall.
For the reasons stated above, I would deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus, and would do so on the merits.