concluding that a statute was "ambiguous because of what it does not say" and then supplying the statutory provision that the Court thought was needed
How later courts described this case
- concluding that a statute was "ambiguous because of what it does not say" and then supplying the statutory provision that the Court thought was needed
- noting that "[u]nder our case law, we hesitate to construe any statute that appears clear and unambiguous”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SIMMS, Justice,
dissenting:
I agree that original jurisdiction should be assumed, however, I would grant the requested relief in the nature of quo warranto. The statute in question, 45 O.S.1991, § 1, is plain and unambiguous on its face. The majority seems to find it ambiguous, not because of what it says, but because of what it doesn’t say. In effect, the majority indulges in judicial legislation by supplying language to the statute which just isn’t there.
A plain reading of § 1 gives State Mining Commissioner, Bennie Cox, a two year term of office. Because his appointment was effective January 1, 1994, his term expired January 1, 1996, at which time the vacancy became subject to being filled by gubernatorial appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate. See 45 O.S.1991, § 1(B). If the Legislature intends otherwise, it is free to amend § 1.
By reason of Okla. Const., Art 23, § 10, Petitioner Cox should be permitted to continue to perform the duties of his office until his successor is duly qualified.
I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Lavender joins with me in the views expressed herein.