The opinion
On.Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
Appellants insist that there is only one class of sewer users in Montgomery, and they belong to class No. 2. That is, those whose property is served by sewers, some' part of which was paid for by assessment against property owners. The charge as made does not take into consideration that status. The ordinance cannot -be so con-' strued as to comply1 with the legal requirement in that respect. ■ -It is “that there' shall be no charge with respect to any portion of such sewer system that may have been paid for wholly or in part by assessments against the property' specially benefited thereby, but any' person whose 'property is served in part by á portion of the sewer system not so paid for may be charged an appropriate rate for the service rendered such property by a sewer disposal plant”, etc.
The rate; for sewer service did not undertake to comply with that feature of the law, assuming that all-property owners on whom the charge is made belong to that class (No. 2). They- should know the basis on which the charge is made when the1 law so requires. When they are not required to pay for the usé of the sewer system, but only for the use of a part of it,then a charge for the use of it all cannot be allocated by the court to that part of it on -which a charge can be made.
Without carefully examining the evidence, we apprehend that at least in some situations the entire cost of the line was *220 assessed against property owners whose property was thus served and to that extent that the entire service specially benefited them. There could be no benefit at all to property simply because sewer pipes were laid in the street adjoining it, unless they are a part of a line of sewers with a dis-r posal provision of some kind. The disposal provision should enter into consideration in fixing the special benefits. Section 525, Title 37, Code. We therefore presume that it did. But whether that is true or not, and assuming that the property owners all belong to class No. 2, they are entitled to know that the charge for the use of the sewers is made upon the principle fixed by law. That does not appear in the ordinance fixing the charge.
We are of the opinion the law is workable but that the charges for the use of the system against those exempt by the Act of 1951, section 4 (which is section 402 [18] of Title 37, Pocket Part, Code) were not collectible; and should be refunded. In the foregoing opinion we noted that the law of 1951, supra, was changed by Act No. 176 of June 30, 1953, which was not here involved. The decree of the trial court was rendered March 18, 1953. That is the decree which was under review. It permanently enjoined the respondents from collecting sewer service charges levied as there set out, but provided that they may be collected and held in trust pending appeal. We affirmed that decree. Under it there should have been collected, as .we hold, charges set up and authorized only under the status of the law as it then stood. That decree was rendered before Act No. 176 of June 30, 1953.
Our judgment simply affirmed that of the trial court, which enjoined the collection of the sewer charge levied as set out in that decree. That decree referred to the resolution of the board adopted August 15, 1952, on the authority of the Act of 1951, supra, and did not in that respect consider the possibility or effect of another act which might in the future be enacted on which the sewer charge could be based as it was ordained by the board. So that the decree as affirmed only affected a status existing not later than March 18, 1953. And when the injunction was made permanent, it meant only in so far as the law then stood, and could not and did not purport to enjoin the collection of a sewer charge claimed under subsequent legislation. See Ex parte Myers, 246 Ala. 460 , 21 So.2d 113 ; Darden v. Darden, 246 Ala. 525 , 21 So.2d 549 .
The question then arises as to the effect of the Act of June 30, 1953, upon the resolution of-the board dated August 15, 1952, fixing a sewer charge.
The decree to the effect that the service charges levied are illegal was well supported: not that the resolution fixing them was void and of no effect. The resolution at the time it was adopted could not apply, not because it violated any law to ordain such a resolution, but that it could not apply to the facts then existing on account of the terms of the Act of 1951, supra. The resolution was not void but not operative at that time because there was no person who was not exempt from its operation. It provides for a continuing status operative when the law so authorized.
Valid ordinances have the same force and effect as acts of the legislature, and remain in force until they are repealed. 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 181, page 338, § 446(f), page 863. There is no objection that a law shall not operate until a future date. State ex rel. Gaston v. Black, 199 Ala. 321 , 74 So. 387 (9); 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 410, page 978.
The ordinance of August 15, 1952 would have been operative if there had been any person within its terms not exempt by law from its operation. When the law, Act of June 30, 1953, removed the exemption from its operation of the persons exempted by the Act of 1951, supra, the operation of the ordinance at once became- effective as to them without further procedure to make it so.
In many respects this is similar to our case of Hawkins v. Jefferson County, 233 Ala. 49 , 169 So. 720 , in which we held with reference to an act of the legislature that *221 it was not void because it could not then apply, but that its operation was merely suspended until such time as the law authorized its application. State Docks Commission v. State ex rel. Jones, 227 Ala. 521 , 150 So. 537 .
Our judgment affirming the decree of the trial court does not contemplate an injunction of the collection of the sewer charge after the Act of June 30, 1953 became operative.
Counsel for appellees have filed a petition in this Court for the allowance of an attorneys’ fee for defending appellees on this appeal. We find the applicable principle thus stated: “On an appeal, the appellate court may fix an attorney’s fee for services rendered, pending the appeal, and may direct the payment thereof dut of a fund in the custody and control of the appellate court.” 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 193, page 1098; Swift v. Jackson, 10 Cir., 37 F.2d 237 .
The decree of the trial court should be affirmed as modified above, and this Court should grant the application for the allowance of an attorneys’ fee to counsel representing appellees on this appeal.
The foregoing opinion was prepared by Foster, Supernumerary Justice of this Court, while serving on it at the request of the Chief Justice under authority of Title 13, section 32, Code, and was adopted by the Court as its opinion.
The decree of the trial court is modified so as not to affect charges collected for sewer service after June 30, 1953, and as modified is affirmed.
In addition to the attorneys’ fee allowed counsel for appellees for services rendered by them in the trial court, which is affirmed, an additional allowance is hereby made for them of $1,000 for representing appellees on this appeal and payable out of the funds ordered to be returned to the users of the sewer system by the trial court as here affirmed.
Modified and affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON, STAKELY, MERRILL and CLAYTON, JJ., concur.
GOODWYN, J., not sitting.