holding IH-SAA rules on eligibility for transfer students reasonable, but unconstitutional because "said bylaws ... sweep too broadly in their proscription and, hence, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment"
How later courts described this case
- holding IH-SAA rules on eligibility for transfer students reasonable, but unconstitutional because "said bylaws ... sweep too broadly in their proscription and, hence, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment"
- finding a student who moved from his parent’s Florida home to live with his adult brother in Indiana and was appointed his legal guardian had an in loco parentis relationship
- agreeing with Court of Appeals' assessment that IHSAA bylaws constitute state action within meaning of Fourteenth Amendment
- showing of reasonableness sufficient to sustain legislative or administrative classification
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Carlberg Ex Rel. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222 (1997)
In support of their argument, Republic and Kenneth direct our attention to Sturrup v. Mahan, 261 Ind. 463, 305 N.E.2d 877 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222 (Ind.1997),
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion
Arterburn, C.J.
There is always a temptation for a court to think that it knows better what is good for party litigants than the administrative body or legislature which fixes rules of conduct. As I said in a previous opinion involving the same type of question as here,
“We are judges, not school board members or athletic officials. We should avoid substituting our judgment for that of officials and parties possessing special knowledge of school conditions. We, as judges, should not sit on the school board.”
Hass v. South Bend Community School Corp. (1972), 259 Ind. 515, at 530 , 289 N. E. 2d 495, at 502 (dissenting).
*471 That is exactly what I think is happening here. Too many courts and judges feel that they know how to run other people’s business better than they do. I frankly admit my ignorance as to how high school athletics should be operated and the problems involved therein. As long as a rule, law or regulation appears to make a reasonable classification to obtain a lawful objective or result it should not be struck down. Here the objective of the rule that does not permit a student to jump from one school to the other and participant in competitive athletics without his parents moving with him is meritorious and appears to me to be reasonable and does not involve a “suspect classification.” This, latter term is nothing more than a method used to put the burden of proof on another party. To me the “suspect classification” occurs when a student moves to another school to participate in competitive athletics without his parents moving with him. That is exactly the situation here. The evidence shows without dispute that the student’s brother wrote a letter in which he said:
“. . . If they would have told me this rule before he (Plaintiff) started school I could have sent him home where he could have played with any difficulties what so ever. I could have send money home every month to help my parent out.” (sic)
This evidence shows that the controlling factor in his move was participation in athletics where he went to school. For the reasons stated, I would affirm the trial court. The facts support it.
Note. — Reported in 305 N. E. 2d 877 .