explaining that we begin statutory analysis "with the language of the statute" read "in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results," and if this analysis yields a plain meaning, we end our inquiry
How later courts described this case
- explaining that we begin statutory analysis "with the language of the statute" read "in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results," and if this analysis yields a plain meaning, we end our inquiry
- explaining that “a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses” and that “[i]f a statute is ambiguous, the reviewing court turns to the scope, history, context, and purpose of the statute” (citation omitted)
- holding that “[w]e assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in the statutory language” and that “the purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and 8 No. 2024AP250 intended effect”
- concluding that when two statutes are " in pari materia, the court must harmonize them if possible"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
{concurring).
¶ 74. I agree with the majority that the applicable standards for a supervisory writ have not been established. I also agree that the district attorney's actions constituted a "refusal" under Wis. Stat. § 968.02 (3). However, I write separately because of the competing discussions of statutory interpretation. Although I commend both the majority and concurrence for their endeavors, I ultimately join neither.