recognizing that the constitutional problem is that the statutes “allows debtors to shield an unlimited amount of assets in a life insurance policy or policies”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that the constitutional problem is that the statutes “allows debtors to shield an unlimited amount of assets in a life insurance policy or policies”
- recognizing that a facial challenge “demands a sweeping pronouncement of the [legislative enactment’s] constitutionality regardless of the factual setting”
- noting that a facial challenge “demands a sweeping pronouncement of the statute[’s] constitutionality regardless of the factual setting”
- "'[Clourts will not pass upon a constitutional question, and decide a statute to be invalid, unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary to the determination of the cause. This court has repeatedly held that questions of this character will not be decided unless such decision is absolutely necessary to a disposition of the cause on its merits.""
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by a later decision, 465 F.3d 309 (2006)
Accordingly, we reject Stinnett's attempt to relegate Foster to cases involving allegations of asset manipulation by the debtor.
The opinion
DICKSON, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
To the extent that the majority opinion concludes that the exemption provided by *1243 Indiana Code §§ 34-2-28-1(a)(6) does not violate Article I, Section 22, of the Indiana Constitution, I concur in the result. However, I dissent from the majority's conclusion that the exemption for life insurance benefiting an insured's spouse is "constitutionally suspect" and may extend only to the "necessities of life." With its decision today, the majority has exposed to creditors' claims the life insurance benefits of most Indiana families, contrary to the express language and intent of the legislature and contrary to the expectations of policyholders and insurance companies alike.
Such a result is not compelled by the clear language of Article 1, Section 22: "The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life, shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or lability hereafter contracted." I remain convinced that these words require the enactment of minimum reasonable exemption laws but do not "impose any maximum limitation upon the power of the Indiana General Assembly to enact generous exemption laws." Matter of Zumbrun, 626 N.E.2d 452, 455 (Ind.1993) (Dickson, J., dissenting). We should interpret this provision in accordance with its clear and unambiguous language as understood by the 82,564 citizens who ratified it rather than to superimpose upon it the strained Zumbrun construction, which is based merely on present-day speculation about the public policy motives of a few of the delegates to the 1850-51 Constitutional Convention.
In response to the certified questions, I would hold that neither the life insurance exemption nor the IRA exemption violates Article I, Section 22 of the Indiana Constitution.