"The insertion of occupant as an alternative to tenant [in § 8A ] causes the statute to be applicable to persons in place in a dwelling whose status may be less than a tenant -- otherwise there is no point in the language"
How later courts described this case
- "The insertion of occupant as an alternative to tenant [in § 8A ] causes the statute to be applicable to persons in place in a dwelling whose status may be less than a tenant -- otherwise there is no point in the language"
- “The absurd notion of a lawyer as a hired gun, who will do anything a client requests, has never had a place in our profession and must not be tolerated.”
- amendment should be allowed unless complication or delay results
- tenant at sufferance may assert 8A counterclaims
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Brown, J.
(concurring). I am repeating myself, but “there must be ethical as well as professional limits on how far a lawyer should go in attempting to [press] a hopeless [case]. This time it appears that counsel has gone too far” (citation omitted). Edinburg v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 22 Mass. App. Ct. 923, 925-926 (1986), (Brown, J., concurring). The majority is too kind in its characterization of the conduct of the tenant’s counsel as “overweening.” I would use more blunt terms: unprofessional and unethical. 1
I fail to see how any truly professional and ethical lawyer could, in good conscience, have pressed this case through two trial courts and one appellate forum. Klug’s Superior Court counsel’s “conduct constituted both an affront to the court’s dignity and a perversion of the court’s purposes as an institution for just resolution of legitimate disputes.” Miaskiewicz v. Commonwealth, 380 Mass. 153, 158 (1980). See S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5), 382 Mass. 770 (1981). Not to condemn this sort of conduct, as a consequence of which “the very temple of justice has been defiled,” Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. *760 575, 580 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.), does a disservice to the bench, the bar, and the public.
In my view, the imposition of sanctions appears to be appropriate here for counsel’s filing of smokescreen counterclaims and for counsel’s apparent acquiescence in the filing of bogus indigency affidavits. 2 See S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 1, DR 7-102(A)(2), 382 Mass. 785 (1981). See also Mass.R.Civ.P. 11(a), 365 Mass. 753 (1974).
The absurd notion of a lawyer as a hired gun, who will do anything a client requests, has never had a place in our profession and must not be tolerated. See S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 7, DR 7-102(A)(1) & (7), 382 Mass. 785 (1981).
Cases such as this one make manifest the need for greater emphasis on attorneys’ professional responsibility and for a more certain threat of sanctions for improper conduct, such as is embodied in Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a), as amended (1987). In any event, I believe our rule 11(a) confers upon the courts the power (if, indeed, such power is not inherent) to sanction attorneys who flagantly disregard or abuse this responsibility. An appropriate motion for sanctions should be filed in the trial court.
On the face of the record, it is fair to infer that Klug’s counsel may have, among other things, participated in a fraud upon the court and, possibly, subornation of perjury.
In these circumstances, the Board of Bar Overseers is obligated to review this matter.